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The User Attribution Problem and the
Challenge of Persistent Surveillance of
User Activity in Complex Networks
Claudio Taglientia, James Cannadya
a
Nova Southeastern University
Abstract. In telecommunication networks, the user attribution problem refers to the challenge faced in
recognizing communication traffic as belonging to a given user when information needed to identify the user
is missing. This problem becomes more difficult to tackle as users move across many mobile networks
(complex networks) owned and operated by different providers. The traditional approach of using the source
IP address as a tracking identifier does not work when used to identify mobile users. Recent efforts to
address this problem by exclusively relying on web browsing behavior to identify users, brought to light the
challenges of solutions which try to link up multiple user sessions together when these approaches rely
exclusively on the frequency of web sites visited by the user. This study has tackled this problem by utilizing
behavior based identification while accounting for time and the sequential order of web visits by a user.
Hierarchical Temporal Memories (HTM) were used to classify historical navigational patterns for different
users. This approach enables linking multiple user sessions together forgoing the need for a tracking
identifier such as the source IP address. Results are promising. HTMs outperform traditional Markov chains
based approaches and can provide high levels of identification accuracy.
Keywords. Accuracy Scalability, Attribution, Complex Networks, Mobile Networks, Concept Drift

Introduction
The internet of people is becoming the internet of things and it is going to
be mobile. Communication devices attached to gas meters, vending machines,
fleets of trucks, payment kiosks, as well as, android phones enabled as WIFI
routers, ipads, and iphones, all seek, sometimes without requiring human
control, persistent connectivity to different resources via complex networks. In
this new and dynamically evolving environment it is becoming increasingly
difficult to identify these devices and their users.
Complex networks represent graphs with patterns of connectivity that are
neither purely regular nor purely random but instead follow a particular
mathematical function, known as the power law where these graphs expand
continuously with the addition of new vertices and new vertices tend to attach
preferentially to other vertices that are already well connected. The hyperlink
connectivity of documents in the World Wide Web, the pattern of connectivity
of users accessing web documents on the web, the nodes that connect the
internet as well as mobile networks that attach to the internet from multiple
locations all share the properties of complex networks.
Traditionally, users are identified via authentication techniques which
verify the legitimacy of either the user or the device accessing that network.
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Once properly authenticated the user/device can access the resources of that
network and potentially other networks for which the user had not been
authenticated. As mobility is becoming pervasive, users continually move
across secured and unsecured networks to access resources available across the
internet. A key question that this study has addressed is: “How can users be
identified when accessing resources across complex networks when no
authentication information is available? The answer to this question has
important implications to identification of malicious users re-entering the
network. In particular, the traditional user identification problem which
leverages authentication to recognize users, morphs into a user attribution
problem when user authentication is not possible. In 2010 Clark and Landau
[12] acknowledged the need for stronger forms of personal identification that
can be observed in the network and defined the attribution problem in terms of
a question: “Why don’t packets have license plates?”. Addressing user
attribution allows users to be recognized among many by attributing a trace of
past user activity to a given user.
While the academic community has recognized this problem and its
complexity, few solutions have been proposed and none address the user
attribution problem that ensues when users move across complex networks
driven by mobility scenarios that have become a mainstream of personal
computing. User identification and user attribution have been addressed in the
context of web usage mining [13, 33, 37, 21, 3, 41] but solutions are strongly
coupled with the web page structure of specific web sites and cannot be applied
in their current form to the more generic user identification problem across
multiple web sites accessed via complex networks. More recently “reidentification” has been proposed as an approach, used in dynamic networks
like telecommunication networks and the internet, which turns the user
identification problem into a matching problem that involves comparing the
behavior of network entities such as users across time periods [27]. The reidentification approach has been successfully applied to email-alias detection,
author attribution [26] and identification of fraudulent consumers in
telecommunication networks, but never in the context of complex networks as
defined in this work.
This study makes a contribution to the field of computer information
systems by tackling the highly relevant and current problem of user attribution
by evaluating the impact of the power law distribution and concept drift present
in complex networks. The proposed research has made use of hierarchical
temporal memories to record and classify historical user activity in the form of
unique time ordered user web site visits. This classification ensures that future
user attributions are based on identification of unique patterns of activity that
match prior activity patterns by a given user. Hierarchical temporal memories
represent a new advance in our understanding of how the neocortex part of a
human brain learns and infers sequence patterns over time.
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1. The Problem

This research has addressed the challenge that no effective method exists
that can recognize the source of communication entering the network or
returning to a web site by only utilizing the communication traffic of the user.
This problem is further exasperated by the fact that often no form of explicit
(user name/password) or implicit (cookies) authentication is available to
identify the source of communication. When user authentication is not
available, users with their communication traffic can no longer be identified,
instead, users can be recognized based on past user activities and the user
identification problem can be restated as a user attribution problem.
In order to better appreciate the severity of this problem, consider a
malicious user that has been authenticated by an operator network and then
proceeds to hack multiple web servers hosted outside the operator network.
Imagine then, that this user continues to perform malicious activity while
moving between secured and unsecured networks. How can this user be
recognized and stopped? Authentication does not help to identify malicious
authenticated users if the attack occurs away from the authentication point. In
addition, a malicious user can hide his tracks and renew his authentication
credentials by switching periodically between network operators. If user
authentication cannot effectively be used to identify users re-entering the
network then what new approach should be used?
Identification of the source of communication traffic has traditionally relied
on the IP address associated with the source of the connection, utilizing it as
the client or user identifier. This client identification technique has been used to
enforce access-control decisions but suffers from several shortcomings that can
potentially make it ineffective [10]:
 A portion of IP addresses are dynamically assigned to clients upon
initial connection to the network.
 A portion of IP addresses are allocated behind Network Address
Translation (NAT) boxes which hide the real IP address (typically a
private IP address) of the client.
 A portion of IP addresses go through web proxies which cause the
client IP address to be replaced by a new public IP address
A large number of IP traceback techniques have been proposed to identify
the source of communication traffic in the literature as reported by [42, 9, 43,
11, 45]. As pointed out by Santhanam et al [42], most IP traceback schemes are
only capable of tracing up to stepping stones (compromised server) which in
the context of complex networks, are similar to NATs and Web Proxies in that
they assign the source IP address and represent one end point of the
communication, thus hiding the real IP address of the user. In addition,
individual organizations would find it difficult, if not impossible, to
successfully utilize IP tracebacks without the involvement of the upstream
internet service provider [6].
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As described, traditional security methods that utilize “IP trace back”
techniques fail to identify the source of communication associated with users
that operate in complex networks (like cellular operator networks) due to the
deployment of large cellular gateways that control the source of
communication (source IP addresses) for millions of users. Specifically,
identification of the source of communication is complicated by the dynamic
assignment of source IP addresses to users by these gateways as well as by the
presence of large scale NAT and web proxy devices in operator networks. It is
difficult to determine how long IP addresses remain allocated to a given user
since IP addresses allocated by cellular gateways, out of very large IP pools,
persist for longer time periods based on operator configuration (up to 24 hours)
than IP addresses modified by NATs or web proxy devices, which are allocated
out of much smaller ranges of IP addresses and change very often, typically for
the duration of a TCP connection.
1.1. Research Questions

These are the research questions that have provided the original motivation
for this study:

Is it possible to recognize specific users among many in the network by
observing and classifying their historical communication behavior and
be at least as accurate in the classification process measured using
recall as when leveraging comparable classification approaches?

Does accuracy scale? That is, can the solution maintain the same level
of accuracy, as the communication population (number of sources and
number of destinations contacted by these sources) increases?
1.2. Assumptions

Two assumptions were made for this study:
(1) HTTP (port 80) traffic was selected as the most representative user
communication type traffic since it is used by web browsers which
require direct user intervention to navigate. An implication of this
study is that it will not be possible to separate any traffic initiated
by applications which do not require user intervention/direction but
still utilize port 80.
(2) This study assumes that a user uses a single non shared device for
all experiments.
1.3. Related Work

The popularity of wireless devices and the rise in supported bandwidth by
WiFi and cellular 4G networks has brought to the forefront the user attribution
problem in the context of mobility scenarios. Between 2009 and 2013 several
researchers have tackled this problem. Two generic frequency based
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approaches have emerged from this work. One leverages source IP address
based identification to track users and uses frequency of access to visited web
destinations to perform inference. Results from this approach are good in terms
of accuracy and scalability but accuracy decreases dramatically when the
source IP changes. The other approach leverages behavior-based identification
which forgoes tracking via the use of a source IP address and only uses
frequency of access to visited web destinations. Results are promising in terms
of recall accuracy but accuracy does not scale well since frequency of visited
web sites does not provide enough unique differentiation among different users
especially when few popular web sites dominate test data sets.
In 2009 Kumpošt and Matyáš [32] took on the user attribution
problem by leveraging vectors of destination IP addresses bound to specific
source IP addresses and classified users based on similarity between train and
test data measured using TF-IDF. Experiments results are mixed showing 21%
false alarms for SSH, and false alarm rates of 70% and 60% for HTTP and
HTTPS. The authors blame the poor results on students moving across campus
and getting assigned different IP addresses. In 2010 Herrmann, Gerber, Banse
and Federrath [24] use behavior-based identification to tackle the user
attribution problem so that users are identified based on access frequencies of
web destinations within a fixed user time window which satisfies classification
based on a Multinomial Naïve Bayes (MNB) classifier. Experiment results
show correct user identification for 50% of the 28 users 80% of the time.
Assumption of conditional independence among sites visited limits the
scalability of this solution. In 2010, Yang [46] also proposed behavior-based
identification. During inference, support and lift are computed to record the
strength of patterns of visited web sites followed by calculating the Euclidian
difference between learned user patterns and newly inferred ones. Experiment
results show 87% accuracy for 100 users using the support based inference.
However, the author acknowledges the difficulty of scaling up the number of
users due to the inability of the approach to link up consecutive user sessions
belonging to the same user. In order to address the scalability problem Yang
suggests, as future research, combining behavior-based identification with the
use of a tracking identifier like a source IP address. In 2012, Banse, Herrmann,
and Federrath [4] use the triplet <epoch, source IP, destination IP> to identify
user sessions by aggregating all events that share that same epoch (time frame)
and source IP based on a Multinomial Naïve Bayes classifier. Experiment
results show correct user identification for 88% of about 2100 user sessions.
The authors also acknowledge that changing the source IP address frequently
decreases accuracy (60% every 3 hours, 49% every hour). In 2013, Hermann,
Banse and Federrath [25] use again the triplet <epoch, source IP, destination
IP> to identify user sessions by aggregating all events that share that same
epoch (time frame) with a source IP based on a comparison of three
classification approaches: 1) 1-Nearest Neighbor Classifier using Jaccard
coefficient and Cosine Similarity), 2) Multinomial Naïve Bayes and 3) using
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lift and support as proposed in Yang [46]. The best accuracy results record up
to 85% recall, using MNB, for over 3000 users with the IP address changing
every 24 hrs. Recall accuracy degrades when the source IP address changes
frequently (65% every 3 hours, 54% every hour). In Yang's study, behavioral
profiling was meant to be used as an additional authentication mechanism (like
a behavioral biometric). Therefore, Yang could assume that the learning
algorithms will have access to a quite large set of labeled sessions for each user.
In fact, the cited result of 87% recall for 100 concurrent users was achieved
with 200 training sessions per user (to derive the support-based patterns for the
profiles) and 100 test sessions, which were processed as a whole to obtain the
support-based profiles, which were to be linked to the training sessions. In
contrast, the work by Herrmann et al. [25] links singular sessions.
Previous research on web mining [21, 37, 41] shows that utilizing the
source IP is a poor choice for identifying users when the source IP address
changes as is the case in mobility scenarios. Previous research also shows that
utilizing exclusively behavior based identification does not scale well. To
understand why consider using the approach proposed in the literature to
identify users that visit 3 popular web sites, say A, B, C. In this case, there
exists a single identifiable pattern <A, B, C> distinguishable only based on the
user frequency of access of each web site. Now consider recording the order of
visits to web sites as an additional way to classify unique patterns. This
approach would increase six fold the number of unique patterns :<ABC>,
<ACB>, <CAB>,<CBA>,<BAC>,<BCA>. Finally, consider taking into
account the time when web sites are visited so that sites visited at
approximately the same time represent a single user timed sequence. Now the
number of unique patterns increases even more: <ABC>, <ACB>,
<CAB>,<CBA>,<BAC>,<BCA>,<A>,<B>,<C>,<AB>,<BC>,<AC>,<CB>,
<CA>,<BA>. Increasing the number of unique identifiable patterns helps
address the presence of popular web sites in the data set creating conditions for
unique differentiation among user patterns that enables to adequately address
the user attribution problem.
2. The Approach

The use of timed sequences is at the heart of the approach used in this
study to address the user attribution problem. Specifically, variable order
Markov chains are used to represent time ordered sequences of web
destinations visited by users. States in the Markov chain represent web sites
visited and transitions between states represent frequency of visits.
Unfortunately, challenges do exist when utilizing traditional Markov chains:
(1) Higher Order Markov Chains increase accuracy but decrease coverage [15].
(2) Markov chains incorrectly recognize never learned before sequences [14].
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When using Markov chains it is difficult to match many different
sequences (high coverage) accurately. The challenge lies in how input
sequences are matched against learned input within Markov chains. The
learned sequence within a Markov chain matched against the input is known as
“context”. The most flexible type of Markov chain is the variable order
Markov chain where the order (length) of the context is allowed to vary.
Variable order Markov chains like PPM-C [35] and All-K [38] attempt to
match exactly the input sequence against a context of size N (where N
represents the order of the Markov chain). If a match is not found then the input
sequence is matched against a shorter context of size N-1, and onward
decreasing the size of the learned sequence in the Markov chain until a match is
found or a mismatch is declared. In 2004, Deshpande and Karypis [15] have
shown that matching a size N context increases accuracy but decreases
coverage (few sequences are identified accurately), while decreasing the size of
N upon mismatches increases coverage but decreases accuracy (many
sequences identified with lower accuracy). Ultimately it is desirable to achieve
both high accuracy and high coverage.
In this study, Markov chain accuracy will be improved using a technique
known as state cloning [14] and further extended with a technique known as
“Sequence Cloning” introduced for the first time in this study. Consider the
Markov chain shown in Fig. 1 created with sequences abd and xbc. Note that
this Markov chain will recognize and generate one of the following four
sequences: abd, abc, xbd or xbc, where sequences abc and xbd were never
learned.

Figure 1 Loss of accuracy in Markov chain

The problem lies with shared state “b” which has the property that its indegree and out-degree are both greater than 1. When this occurs, the Markov
chain will identify more sequences than were learned. To address this problem
state cloning (duplicating the shared state) is traditionally used to address the
issue as shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2 State Cloning

However, traditional state cloning is not always sufficient to address
situations were multiple states are shared as shown in Fig. 3.

Figure 3 Limitations of State Cloning

The Markov chain in Fig.3 originally learned sequences <5, 1, 2, 3> and <1,
2, 3, 4> yet two more sequences are identified. Note that the single node
cloning conditions are not violated, yet this graph produces two sequences that
were never learned: 1, 2, 3 and 5, 1, 2, 3, 4. In this case, the problem occurs at
the transitions covered by points a and b. These transitions allow the generation
through shared nodes 1 and 3 of more than 2 sequences. Namely: <1, 2, 3, 4>,
<1,2,3>, <5,1,2,3>, <5,1,2,3,4>. To address this problem the state cloning
approach is extended to cover sequences of shared states such that sequence
cloning is needed when the first shared node in a sequence of shared nodes has
an in-degree greater than 1 and the last shared node in a sequence of shared
nodes has an out-degree also greater than 1. By duplicating all shared states we
solve the problem as shown in Fig. 4. Note that both state and sequence cloning
increase accuracy but also increase the number of nodes in a Markov chain.
This study introduces the idea of accurately matching a learned timed
sequence (context) loosely not necessarily exactly using a combination of
longest common subsequence and longest common substring calculations
instead of matching “exactly” the context of learned sequences stored in
variable order Markov chains.
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Figure 4 Sequence Cloning

While use of timed sequences of visited web destinations allows increasing
the discriminating power of the solution, there still is a need to link up multiple
user sessions (sequences) in order to address the poor scalability problem faced
by behavioral based identification techniques that forgo the use of a tracking
identifier like the source IP address. In this study, hierarchical temporal
memories (HTMs) are used to address this need.
A Hierarchical Temporal Memory (HTM) is a technology that is modeled
on the algorithms used in the neocortex of the brain [19, 23]. Network nodes in
an HTM, are organized in a hierarchical way, with each node implementing
learning and memory functions. Hierarchical Temporal Memories are an
appropriate tool to study complex networks. HTMs perform well when the data
they process support a hierarchical structure. Ravasz and Barabasi [40] show
that the scale free and high degree of clustering of complex networks like the
World Wide Web are the consequence of a hierarchical organization. They
show that a small group of nodes, such as communities of interest in the WWW,
organize in a hierarchical manner forming larger groups, while still maintaining
a scale free topology. This self-similar nesting of different groups into other
groups forces a hierarchical structure that well fits the ability of HTMs to
correlate groups that are close in space and time. For more information on why
HTMs were chosen to deal with complex networks see Appendix G.
2.1. HTM Inputs

The next few sections will introduce many terms, computations and
symbols which are defined in Appendix I. Figure 7 shows a typical HTM with
its inputs. Input sequence (IS) is the input sequence being matched by a given
HTM layer. For HTM layer 1, IS is a sequence of web destinations (in a real
cellular network these are extracted from HTTP requests) and for HTM layers
2 and 3 it is a sequence of temporal groups (variable order Markov chains)
matched in the layer below. At layer 1, input is of the form: Timestamp<TS,
Dest> where the format of this input is fully described in the “Session
Identification” section.
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At HTM layers 2 and 3 input is of the form: λ𝐿𝑥 < 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝑔𝑖
, 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝑔𝑖+1, 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝑔𝑖+2,… > where 2 ≤ x ≤ 3 represent layers above the first HTM
layer and 1 ≤ i ≤ the number of Markov Chains at HTM layer Lx-1. λ𝐿𝑥 is a
vector of feed forward beliefs, which measures how well inputs match learned
sequences and is a vector where only one index is filled based on which
temporal group gi matched the input at the lower layer Lx-1 of the HTM. The
λ𝐿𝑥 vector represents the input for HTM layers 2 and 3 where the index of the
entry in the vector that is filled represents the feed forward belief of the specific
temporal group gi is received from lower HTM layers. For instance, vectors
λ𝐿2 <0, 0.4, 0> and λ𝐿2 <0.8, 0, 0>, show layer 2 of the HTM receiving from
layer 1 a sequence of temporal groups 𝑆𝑔21 (g2, g1) with feed forward belief
values of 40% and 80% for temporal groups 2 and 1 respectively.
2.1.1. Session Identification

In this study, the TCP timestamp TS value [29] is used to identify and track
user sessions only during the training phase of experiments. The use of TCP
timestamps was inspired by the work of Kohno, Broido and Claffy [30]. These
authors proposed device recognition by fingerprinting devices via detection of
changes in clock skews among different devices using the TCP Timestamp
option. Kohno et al., believe that their approach can be used to identify the
same physical device among a large number of devices since there exist
variability in the clock skew of different physical devices, and it holds that the
clock skew for a given device is constant and independent of network access
technology. This approach differs from the way in which TCP timestamps are
used in this study, where they are leveraged to track directly user sessions and
consider clock skew not as a unique fingerprint for devices but instead noise
that will decrease the tracking capabilities of this session identification
approach. In general, any fingerprinting approach which identifies a logical
source (e.g. source IP address) or a physical device as done in Kohno et al.
suffers in deployments which obfuscate the source. This becomes particularly
problematic in session identification when trying to link up TCP packets
belonging to the same user. Consider fingerprinting a device as proposed in
Kohno et al. which requires the TCP timestamp value to be passed unchanged
through a middle box. Many middle boxes deployed in cellular networks act as
“proxies” by splitting the TCP connection between the device and the origin
server into two separate TCP connections which cause the origin server to
negotiate TCP timestamp options with the middle box instead of the device
[28]. This causes the middle box to be mistaken for the real source. This is not
a problem when TCP timestamps are used for session identification as
proposed in this study. The ability to link up TCP packets belonging to the
same user during training will not be impacted whether tapping of
communication traffic occurs between device and middle box or middle box
and origin server. This is because this approach does not track the source but
connections and in this case both connections are surrogates for the single end
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to end connection between device and origin server. We are not aware of other
work that leveraged TCP timestamps to track communication sessions as was
done for this study.
Training of HTMs is completely unsupervised and leverages the
tracking strength of the TS value to identify consecutive web visits as
belonging to the same user session (observation). This is different from the
supervised training approach used by Yang in her experiments where a label
(user-id) was used to train her inference model. During training, in this study,
session identification and user identification are one and the same. During the
inference stage the assumption that a specific session belongs to a given user
no longer holds and instead the TS value is only used to identify an anonymous
session (a set of consecutive web visits belonging to an unknown user that
make up an observation). The task of assigning an anonymous session to a
specific user is carried out by the Markov chains performing inference within
the different layers of each HTM based on past learned patterns of users’
sessions (web visits). All HTMs attempt to recognize each anonymous session
and only one HTM will be able to recognize it better than the other HTMs
based on its past training.
Beacken et al. [7] have discovered that the TCP Timestamp field used for
iphones always starts at the same date/value when the device is restarted but for
android devices, the TCP timestamp value on device power up is random. They
state that this allows one to be able to distinguish iphones from android type
devices. In this study, the TCP time stamp value, a 32 bit value, which
implements a virtual clock on each device, is used to uniquely identify unique
sessions associated with a given user. The prototype built for this study
identifies multiple communication sessions during the training phase of
learning that belong to different users by tracking the unique TS value (TS) of
each device. During training, all communication input associated with a given
<TS> value within a given time window is fed to a hierarchical temporal
memory (HTM) to identify the communication patterns associated with
sessions belonging to different users. These communication patterns are
defined in terms of the destinations (Dest, a number mapping to the IP address
of the web site) visited by this user. The timestamp, calculated from the input
at HTM layer 1, has a resolution of 1 millisecond and represents the passage of
time with respect to the arrival of input to the HTM. The time stamp is
specifically needed to distinguish multiple <TS, Dest> input pairs immediately
following each other with potentially the same TCP time stamp values, as
either all arriving at the same time or at different times.
The algorithm in Fig.5 was used to implement communication session
identification during the training phase of classification and selection of
appropriate HTMs to perform communication pattern identification.
Each HTMUx once created runs a virtual clock with a 1 ms resolution used
to track the TS value of sessions associated with this HTM. The allowed TS
clock window was computed as follows: Allowed-TS-Clock-Window = [TSv +
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Clock()] ± Clock-Skew-Factor. The computation TSv + Clock() needs to
account for wrap around at 232. The Clock-Skew-Factor is a fixed maximum
allowed clock skew.
Unfortunately, using a fixed window offset from the currently received
TCP TS counter to measure clock skew, can potentially either underestimate
(lose a single tracked user session) the clock skew with a window that is too
small or overestimate (identify a single user session as belonging to multiple
user sessions) the clock skew with a window that is too large. A possible way
to address this problem is to allow for dynamic resynchronization of the HTM
TS counter with a tracked source based on how much of an offset (within a
window) a given new received TCP timestamp is from the existing HTM TS
counter. This approach would use the new TCP time stamp received as the new
TS counter value each time the new TS value is within the window but does
not match exactly the current HTM TS counter. This could address the
potential increase in clock skew that occurs over time overcoming the
limitations of a fixed HTM TS counter. With this newly proposed approach, it
will be possible to use a small window size since the algorithm is able to adjust
to clock skew over time. The benefit of this approach, as well as determining
the best size for the clock skew window, is an area of further research that
should be based on the empirical results of studying the characteristics of clock
skew of mobile devices in real mobile networks.
IF ( Given input: <TSv,Dest>, TSv is out of range of allowed TS clock skew window for any
HTMUx )THEN
// New user not identified before
// Create a new HTM to track communication patterns from this source
Create New HTMUx (Timestamp:<TSv,Dest>)
ELSE IF (Given input: <TSv,Dest>, TSv is in range of allowed TS clock skew window for a single
HTMUx) THEN
// Existing user already being tracked
Invoke existing HTMUx (Timestamp:<TSv,Dest>)
ELSE // The TCP timestamp matches more than one HTM
Drop the input
Update counter: Unable-to-Distinguish-Session
ENDIF
Figure 5 TCP Timestamp Session Identification Algorithm

2.2. How the HTM Works

Each HTM learns and then performs inference. Learning occurs in an
unsupervised manner, starting from the bottom layer of the HTM, one layer at a
time. Layer 1 learns first. After that, layer 2 learns and once layer 2 is done
learning layer 3 completes learning. During training a new HTM is created for
each user each time a not seen before user session (based on TCP timestamp
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tracking) is encountered. Learning entails both spatial and temporal learning.
Spatial learning at layer 1 covers identification of individual sequences of web
destinations, while at layer 2 and 3 it covers identification of individual
sequences of coincidences (temporal groups representing Markov chains
matched from the layer below).
Initial learning is completed at each HTM layer with creation of a single
Markov graph representing all learned sequences within that HTM layer. At the
end of training this single graph is split into many variable order Markov
chains by merging all nodes that are most highly connected into one of several
Markov chains based on a depth first traversal of the Markov graph (see Fig. 6)
thus ensuring that sequences are maintained and not broken up and that
sequences held in Markov chains do not overlap.
While there are more nodes to be processed from the Markov graph Do
-

Pick the next node (seed node) from the Markov graph not yet processed adjacent
to the “Start” state. This seed node is the first node of a new Markov Chain gi

-

Perform a depth first traversal of the Markov graph originating from the seed
node and add all traversed nodes to Markov Chain gi that have not been processed
yet

-

Potentially merge this Markov Chain gi with another already processed Markov
Chain gx if Markov Chain gi has elements in common (same node in the Markov
graph) with Markov Chain gx. When merging, smaller Markov chains get merged
into larger ones.

EnDo
Figure 6 Algorithm to create Markov Chains from a single Markov Graph

These Markov chains represent destinations or coincidences (temporal
groups) that are highly temporally correlated based the specific temporal order
in which they follow each other.
After learning is completed at a given HTM layer, playback occurs. During
playback, each HTM at layer Ln which completed learning is used to bootstrap
learning for the layer above Ln+1 using the already learned sequences at layer
Ln. Playback (an approach introduced in this study) improves the time it takes
to train the HTM and allows higher layers to learn higher level concepts that
are consistent with the lower level concepts learned by the layers below. In the
playback stage, learned sequences at layer n are generated in increasing order
of time, so that layer n+1 can correctly learn higher level concepts from the
layer below. This in effect simulates the HTM been retrained on the same input
used to train the layer below. In order to generate sequences in increasing time
order (from oldest to most recent), each node in the Markov graph holds a
FIFO queue of timestamps. Each time stamp represents the time when a node
was created or modified by updating or adding incoming or outgoing links
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to/from this node. Time ordered sequence generation is achieved by traversing
the Markov graph at each layer of the HTM, starting from the “start” state,
while removing from the front of the FIFO queues timestamps associated with
nodes with the least recent (oldest) timestamp for each transition up to the
“final” state.
During inference the HTM layer collects input until a sequence is formed.
The spatial and temporal poolers at each layer of the HTM ensure that
sequences are created so that nodes that follow each other in space (sequential
order of inputs) and time (timely order of inputs) are grouped together creating
a sequence matched against learned sequences of coincidences (stored within
variable order Markov chains gi). The HTM spatial and temporal poolers
terminate a sequence and start another under one of the following terminating
conditions: (TC1) A fixed maximum input size has been processed. (TC2) A
maximum learned inter destinations arrival rate is exceeded. (TC3) The same
destination is already present in the sequence (HTM version 1). Note that only
HTM layer 1 uses terminating condition TC2.
Each HTM layer matches the input sequence collected against learned
sequences held in Markov chains and finds the best (longest) matching learned
sequence (LLS). Each HTM layer computes the feed forward belief ( λ ) of the
best matching learned sequence (LLS). This feed forward belief combines the
degree of membership (how well input matches learned sequences) and
persistence (how often a matched learned sequence is visited). Belief
propagation occurs when HTM layer n passes as input the feed forward belief (
λ) to HTM layer n+1. Belief propagation for casual (Bayesian) networks was
first proposed by Judea Pearl [36] and then adapted to HTMs by Deleep
George [19].
The output that is sent to the Max Output Layer (see Fig. 8) from each HTM
includes identification of the specific HTM and provides the feed forward
belief of the matched observation input across all layers of that HTM. The Max
Output Layer aggregates the feed forward beliefs (λOutput) of up to one
observation worth of data (50 web sites) from each HTM using one of seven
HTM algorithms and then selects the HTM (user) with the maximum
aggregated feed forward belief value among all HTMs as the one that best
matches the HTM layer 1 input.
HTMs use one of seven algorithms proposed in this study (detailed in
section “HTM Algorithms Calculations”) to aggregate feed forward beliefs and
to determine how well an observation matches HTMs’ learned input. Each one
of the seven different HTM algorithms (based on the HTM layer where they
are applied 1 or 3) combines feed forward beliefs associated with a given input
observation based on one of three generic algorithms: average, weighted sum
and path probability. The average based algorithm simply computes the
averages of feed forward beliefs associated with a given observation. Weighted
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sum algorithms (BottomUp and TopTop) use weights proportional to the size
of an observation matched by a given feed forward belief. The BottomUp
algorithm aggregates the feed forward belief with weights proportional to an
observation at layer 1 so that the degree of membership calculation at higher
layers will be impacted by this weight as the feed forward belief travels up the
HTM layers (see Table 1). The TopTop algorithm aggregates the feed forward
belief with weights proportional to an observation matched at layer 3. The Path
Probability algorithm leverages the idea of independence among feed forward
beliefs and simply multiplies together the feed forward beliefs belonging to a
given observation.

Figure 7 Hierarchical Temporal Memory layers

2.3. Feed Forward Belief Calculations

As shown in Fig. 7 the key computation performed by HTMs creates
groups of feed forward beliefs (λ<FFBs>) that match the input presented to
each HTM layer. The idea is to find the longest learned sequence (LLS) out of
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all the learned sequences in all of the Markov chains in a given HTM layer
which best matches (has the highest degree of membership (DM) as shown in
equation (8)) the input sequence (IS). The calculation of DM and persistence
(SP equation (7)) of the matched LLS represents how well inferred input (IS) is
matched against learned input. In terms of notation: (Abbreviation) Function
name (Arg1,…Argn) represents a function “Function name” which takes n
arguments Arg1,…Argn and is referenced using the abbreviated name
“Abbreviation”. The rest of this section presents the key calculations necessary
to compute feed forward beliefs (equations 9 and 10) that are calculated within
each HTM layer before being propagated up to next layer. Refer to Appendix I
for specific explanations of abbreviations used in this section.
(ALLLS_Cond) Adjusted Length LLS Condition(IS, cLLS) =
if IS is a substring of cLLS and IS1 = cLLS1 and | cLLS | > |IS|
(ALLLS)Adjusted Length LLS(IS, cLLS) = {

|𝐼𝑆|
ALLLS_Cond
max(|𝐼𝑆|, |𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆|) otherwise

(LCSm) Longest Common Subsequence Measure(IS, cLLS) =
(LCSUm) Longest Common Substring Measure (IS,cLLS) =

|𝐿𝐶𝑆(𝐼𝑆,𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆) |
𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆(𝐼𝑆,𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆)
|𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑢(𝐼𝑆,𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆) |
𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆(𝐼𝑆,𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆)

(1)

(2)

See Appendix C for an example of how to use equations (1) and (2).
(Fq) Frequency of visits (cLLSi) = Number of times cLLSi occurs in Markov chain gi
within this HTM layer across all Markov chains in that HTM layer
(3)
NLS = Number of all learned sequences within a given HTM layer
(Ps) Persistence (cLLS) =

𝐹𝑞(𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑆)
𝑁𝐿𝑆

(4)

Similarity Weights = Ws + Wu + Wp = 1.0
where in this study Ws = 0.495, Wu = 0.495, Wp = 0.01

(5)

(SS) Sequence Similarity (IS, cLLS) =
(LCSm(IS, cLLS) × Ws) + (LCSUm(IS, cLLS) × Wu )

(6)

(SP) Sequence Persistence (cLLS) = (Ps(cLLS) × Wp)
(7)
(DM) Degree of Membership (IS, cLLS) =
(8)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑆 (SS (IS, cLLS))
when |∀s, SS (IS, cLLS)> SS(IS,s) | == 1 (8.a)
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑆 (SS (IS, cLLS) , SP(cLLS)) when |∀s, SS (IS, cLLS)> SS(IS,s) | > 1 (8.b)
where s = all learned sequences, including cLLS, in a given HTM layer
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The best matching LLS is that candidate LLS (cLLS), in a given HTM
layer, that has the maximum degree of membership value when measured
against the input sequence (IS). For instance, assume IS = <S1, S3> which
matches cLLS1 <S1,S2,S3,S4> and cLLS2 = <S1, S3, S6> in Fig.14, then LLS
which satisfies DM(IS,cLLS) is cLLS2 since:
LCSm(IS,cLLS) = LCSm(IS, cLLS2) = 2/2
LCSUm =(IS,cLLS) = LCSu(IS, cLLS2) = 2/2
LCSm(IS,cLLS) = LCSm(IS, cLLS1) = 2/4
LCSUm =(IS,cLLS) = LCSu(IS, cLLS1) = 1/4
SS(IS, cLLS1) = (0.5 × 0.495) + (0.25 × 0.495)
SS(IS, cLLS2) = (1 × 0.495) + (1 × 0.495)
SS(IS, cLLS2) > SS(IS, cLLS1) then based on (8.a) 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐿𝐿𝑆 (SS (IS, cLLS)) is
cLLS2.

When more than one cLLS sequence exists with the same maximum
sequence similarity values then the more persistent of these cLLS sequences is
chosen. Consider a different example where IS = <S1, S6> and from Fig.14
cLSS1 = <S1, S8, S6> and cLSS2 = <S1, S3, S6>, in this case equation 8.b is used
since two sequences have the same sequence similarity values, namely
|SS(IS,cLLS1) = SS(IS,cLLS2)| > 1. In this case, LLS = <S1, S3, S6> since
SP(cLLS2) = 2/16 > SP(cLLS1) = 1/16
(FFB) Feed Forward Belief (IS, LLS) =
(9)
min(1.0, DM (IS, LLS) + SP(LLS)) where min is the minimum function

FFB(IS,LLS) is the feed forward belief used with all HTM algorithms except
for path probability. The feed forward belief applied with the path probability
HTM algorithm (see section “HTM Algorithm Calculations” for details) is
shown below:
(FFB_PP) Path Probability of LLS (LLS) =
(10)
P(LLS) = P(LLS1) × P(LLS2| LLS1) × P(LLS3| LLS1 LLS2) × .. P(LLSn| LLS1…LLSn-1),
where:
𝐹𝑞(𝐿𝐿𝑆1)

P(LLS1) =

{

if 𝐿𝐿𝑆1 = 𝐼𝑆1

NLS

penalty = 0.0001

otherwise

(11)

where penalty is an error probability for mismatches against IS.
Fq(LSS j→k) = Frequency of visits across node transition j→k
P(LLSk | LLSj) =

𝑭𝒒(𝑳𝑳𝑺𝒋→𝒌)
𝑭𝒒(𝑳𝑳𝑺𝒋)

where k,j > 1

(12)
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2.4. Feed Forward Belief Propagation Calculations

Feed forward beliefs propagate through HTM layers, as shown in Fig. 7,
following the formulas shown in Table 1. Feed forward beliefs exiting the
output (last) HTM layer will be directed to the Max HTM output layer, shared
across all HTMs, which aggregates feed forward beliefs for an each
observation worth of inputs (see Fig. 8).
Table 1. FEED FORWARD BELIEFS FOR EACH HTM LAYER
HTM Layers
MAX HTM
Output layer
Output
HTM1..M
Layer 3
Output/MAX
HTM Output
layer Input

HTM1..M
Layer2
Output/
HTM1..M
Layer3 Input
HTM1..M
Layer1
Output/
HTM1..M
Layer2 Input
HTM1..M
Layer1 Input
received
from the
network

Feed Forward Beliefs Propagation
(𝑶𝑹)𝑶𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒖𝒍𝒕 = < HTM_name, MAX_FFB_HTMs, Observation
input>, 𝐻𝑇𝑀_𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 is the name of the HTM matching Observation input with the
highest aggregated feed forward belief value computed using MAX_FFB_HTMs
for 𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 over all HTMs.
𝑭𝑭𝑩_𝑷𝑷𝒈𝒌 (𝑳𝑳𝑺) × (𝑰𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒈𝒋..𝒋+𝑵 ) if HTM algorithm is Path Probability
λOutput = {
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒌 (𝑺𝒈𝒋..𝒋+𝑵 , 𝑳𝑳𝑺) × (𝑰𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒈𝒋..𝒋+𝑵 )
otherwise
(13)
where 1 ≤ k ≤ Number of Markov Chains at HTM layer 3. Note that when the
HTM is configured with only 1 layer then λL2 = λOutput
𝑭𝑭𝑩_𝑷𝑷𝒈𝒋 (𝑳𝑳𝑺) × (𝑰𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵 )
if HTM algorithm is Path Probability
λL3 = {
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒋 (𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵 , 𝑳𝑳𝑺) × (𝑰𝑨𝑳𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵 )
otherwise
(14)
where 1 ≤ j ≤ Number of Markov Chains at HTM layer L2
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊 (𝑰𝑺, 𝑳𝑳𝑺) × (
λL2 ={𝑭𝑭𝑩_𝑷𝑷𝒈𝒊 (𝑳𝑳𝑺)
𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊 (𝑰𝑺, 𝑳𝑳𝑺)

|𝑰𝑺|
𝑶𝑺

)

if HTM algorithm is BottomUP
if HTM algorithm is Path Probability
otherwise

(15)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ Number of Markov Chains at HTM layer L1 and Observation size
is 50
Timestamp<TS,Dest1> … Timestamp<TS,DestN>

The input activation level equation shown below measures the strength of a
match between input and learned sequences and is further defined in Appendix
I.
(𝐼𝐴𝐿𝑆𝑔𝑖..𝑖+𝑁 ) Input Activation Level(𝑆𝑔𝑖..𝑖+𝑁 , 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝒈𝒊 ) =

(16)
|𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵|

min(1.0,

∑𝒊=𝟏

𝐹𝐹𝐵𝒈𝒊

|𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵|

)
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2.5. HTM Algorithms Calculations

The seven HTM algorithms described in previous sections are
implemented based on the three generic algorithms defined by equations 18, 19
and 20. The algorithms are deployed mainly in the Max Output Layer and also
across the HTM layers for the Path probability and BottomUP algorithms. Fig.
8 shows λOutput which represents the feed forward belief output from layer 3 of
an HTM to the Max Output layer and 𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 which is a sequence of
such feed forward beliefs. These parameters are used by the Max output layer
to compute the highest valued feed forward belief for a given observation using
the formula shown below.
(MAX_FFB_HTMs) Max Feed Forward Belief for HTMs(𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 ) =

(17)

𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐻𝑇𝑀1..𝑀 (HTM_Algorithma( 𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 )) where a is one of 3

generic HTM algorithms (Average, Weighted Sum, Path Probability) , 1 ≤ M
≤ number of HTMs/users learned during training, HTM1..M is the name of all
HTMs learned during training.

Figure 8 HTM Max Output Layer Inputs and Output

The three generic HTM algorithms which process feed forward beliefs
within the Max HTM Output Layer are shown below:
NB = |𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 | is the number of beliefs per observation.
Average (𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 ) = (∑𝑁𝐵
𝑘=1 λOutput 𝑘 ) /NB

(18)
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Weighted Sum ( 𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 , ISk, OS)
∑𝑁𝐵
𝑘=1 (λOutput 𝑘 ×

|𝐼𝑆𝑘 |
𝑂𝑆

)

=

(19)

where ISk is HTM layer 1 input

sequence associated with λOutput 𝑘 and OS = Observation size (50 web
destinations at HTM layer 1)
Path Probability (𝑆λOutput𝑘..𝑘+𝑁 ) = ∏𝑁𝐵
𝑘=1 λOutput 𝑘

(20)

See Appendix E for an example on how the Max HTM Ouput layer utilizes
HTM algorithms. Table 2 provides more details about which HTM layer
provides inputs to the Max Output layer for specific HTM algorithms.
Table 2 HTM Algorithms
HTM Algorithms
Average
TopTop
ButtomUP
Path Probability

HTM Generic
Algorithms
(HTM_Algorithma)
Average
Weighted Sum
Average
Path Probability

HTM Layers
supplying input to
Max HTM Output
1,3
3
1,3
1,3

How to read table 2: The Average and BottomUP HTM algorithms use the
average generic HTM algorithm with inputs to Max HTM Output Layer from
HTM layers 1 and 3 (see Fig.8). The TopTop HTM algorithm uses the
weighted sum algorithm with inputs exclusively from layer 3. Allowing HTM
algorithms to generate inputs from either HTM layer 1 or 3 was done to enable
verification of HTMs with and without HTM hierarchies. The BottomUp
algorithm, takes the average of feed forward beliefs at the Max HTM Output
Layer computed using the weighted sum at layer 1 (see Table 1 equation (15)).
This was done to normalize differences in calculations due to large number of
beliefs produced from layer 1 versus the few number of beliefs produced from
layer 3 of HTMs.
3. Experiments

The HTM together with the entire set of tools needed to support the
experiments conducted in this study were developed from scratch in Java. It
became critical then to qualify the HTM to guarantee its correct
implementation before performing any experiments. A “calibration” procedure
was used to ensure that experiments run using all seven HTM algorithms, as
well as, all alternate Markov chain based algorithms would be able to recognize
users using their own trained data set instead of a different test data set,
achieving in the case of synthetic data sets, 100% recall accuracy results. This
initial calibration criterion was used to qualify each one of the HTMs and
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alternate Markov chains algorithms as being correctly implemented with
respect to their ability to accurately train and infer their own input. It became
also important to create reference data sets for the experiments themselves,
allowing validation of the algorithms against a well understood baseline. For
this purpose synthetic data sets were created (see Appendix F for a description
of how synthetic data was created to be as close as possible to real network
data). Only if the HTM and alternate Markov chain algorithms could achieve
high levels of recall accuracy with these synthetic data sets would a
corresponding new set of experiments be conducted with real network data
extracted from an operator cellular network. In this study a total of 514
experiments were conducted utilizing synthetic data and 228 experiments
utilizing real network data.
Table 3 shows the entire set of experiments conducted in this study. All
experiments test the ability of the seven HTM algorithms to attribute
communication traffic to users under test. In addition, four alternate algorithms
based on Markov chains (MC) were also tested (E1, E2, E6) in order to compare
the HTM inference recall accuracy performance against traditional algorithms
that, like HTM algorithms, recognize sequences leveraging Markov chains. A
single experiment usually entails training either the HTM using one of the
seven HTM algorithms or training one of four MC algorithms on a specific
data set (synthetic or real) to perform a specific experiment such as user
identification. User identification experiments with synthetic data sets were
performed without noise (E1) and with noise introduced in the test data set in
the form of either concept drift (E2) or in the form of DOS or Phish attacks (E3,
E4). The ability to maintain high levels of recall accuracy performance with
increasing number of users (E1, E5) and increasing number of destinations (E1)
was also measured. Similar experiments were also performed utilizing data sets
collected from a real cellular network (E6-E11). Experiments E13 and E14 verify
the ability of the HTM to identify users, utilizing real network data, by
continuing to learn during the inference phase of the experiment instead of just
learning during the train phase of the experiment. Experiments E12 measure the
accuracy of session identification performed during the train phase of user
identification experiments.
Markov chain based algorithms were chosen because of Markov chains’
ability to recognize sequences and because the HTM also uses Markov chains,
albeit with modifications. The following types of Markov chains (MC) were
used to baseline this work: [Fixed Order] 1st Order Markov Chains, [Fixed
Order] 3rd Order Markov Chains, [Variable Order] All-K Markov model,
where K=3, [Variable Order] (PPM-C) Prediction by Partial Match, where K=3.
In this study, mismatches found by MC based algorithms between learned and
new input sequences are assigned a fixed penalty when using fixed order
Markov chains and a variable penalty proportional to the number of different
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destinations matched so far and their frequencies when using variable order
Markov chains.
Table 3. FOURTEEN SETS OF EXPERIMENT FOR THIS STUDY
Experiment Types (E1-14)

Data Type

(E1) User Identification no concept drift
(E2) User Identification with concept drift
(E3) User Identification under DOS attack
(E4) User Identification under Phish attack
(E5) HTM Accuracy Scalability
(E6) User Identification Alternate MC
(E7) User Identification HTM2++
(E8) )User Identification HTM2
(E9) User Identification HTM1
(E10) User Identification under DOS attack
(E11) User Identification under Phish attack
(E12) Session Identification
(E13) User Identification continuous learning
(E14) User Identification under DOS attack
with continuous learning

Synthetic
Synthetic
Synthetic
Synthetic
Synthetic
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real
Real

Number of
Experiments
using HTM
Algorithms (7)
210
84
21
21
10
42
42
42
21
21
18
12
6

Number of
Experiments
using
alternate
MC
Algorithms
(4)
120
48
24
-

3.1. Experiments Using Synthetic Data

Three hundred and thirty experiments (E1) were conducted using synthetic
data without simulating context drift which used 1000, 5000, and 10,000
visited web destinations. These experiments simulated 5, 20, 50, 100, 500 users
accessing the network using 5 days’ worth of train data and either one or two
days’ worth of test data or just 3 observations (one observation “Obs” equals
50 visited web destinations) worth of test data per user. For instance, Table 21
in Appendix H shows that for 5 users and 1000 visited web destinations, 11
experiments are executed using 5 train days and 1 test day (5/1), 11
experiments using 2 days’ worth of test data(5/2), 11 experiments using 3
observations (3 Obs) worth of test data for a total of 33 experiments. On the
other hand for 500 users using 5000 destinations Table 21 shows 11
experiments being executed using 3 observations in the test data set.
All 132 concept drift experiments (E2) shown in Table 22 in Appendix H
involved visits to 1000 web destinations with 5 users, with 5,10,15,20 training
days and 2,3,4,5 test days’ worth of test data respectively (see Appendix F for a
description of how concept drift was simulated using a random walk algorithm).
Concept drift is introduces in the form of 20% new destinations and 10% new
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transitions between destinations not in the original train data set. The first line
of Table 22 represents the baseline (no concept drift).
In this study, users are identified based on their normal behavior and
anomalous traffic is introduced as a form of noise to understand how much user
identification accuracy is lost when noise (in the form of an attack) is
introduced in the normal communication traffic patterns of users. The idea is
not to identify the attack traffic but to identify normal traffic (tied to a specific
user) in spite of the presence of embedded attack traffic (noise). The
assumption is that when noise is introduced in the form of a phish or DOS
attack from the device, it is due to the device having been compromised,
possibly based on a download of an infected application. As the subscriber uses
his mobile device to browse the internet (normal behavior) the malicious app is
at work in the background, launching its phish or DOS attacks. Table 23 in
Appendix H shows twenty-one experiments (E3) which were conducted with
HTM algorithms by simulating denial of service attacks, embedded within
synthetic network data, where the attack is initiated from individual devices
during the test phase to a number of destinations (5, 10, 20) learned at train
time. The destinations are attacked repeatedly over time (within a time interval
of 5, 10, 20 ms and spaced by a fixed time interval of 5 ms). The idea is to
determine how well the HTM can continue to identify users before and after
the attack. In these experiments 10 users are used and 4 of them are assumed to
be infected and to start DOS attacks during the test phase. The motivation for
attacking destinations learned at train time is based on the assumption that
perpetrators of DOS attacks typically target sites or services hosted on highprofile web servers such as on-line retailers, banks, credit card payment
gateways which are likely to have been visited by the user, thus making the
attack less likely to be detected (less conspicuous).
Table 24 in Appendix H shows twenty-one experiments which simulate
phishing attacks (E4), embedded within synthetic network data, which were run
using HTM algorithms. For these experiments, attacks are initiated from
individual devices during the test phase where unique destinations (1, 3, 5) are
randomly selected from outside the user training data set (to simulate access to
never visited before web phish sites) and attacked within a time interval (1ms,
3ms, 5ms) spaced by a random time intervals (1 minute – 1 hour).
Ten scalability experiments (E5) were also run using the two best
performing HTM algorithms to measure the ability of the HTM to accurately
identify users as the number of users increased from 150 to 500 users
3.2. Experiments Using Real Network Data

The next set of user identification experiments used real network data
collected from a CDMA/LTE cellular data network in North America over a
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period of approximately a month. Experiments were conducted against HTMs
using the following parameters: 5 and 10 users, 5 train days and 1 test day, 5
train days and 2 test days, 10 train days and 3 test days. The actual number of
different web destinations visited by all users over the month was: 4903
destinations for 5 train days/1 test day, 5221 destinations for 5 train days/2 test
days , 6672 destinations for 10 train days/3 test days.
The data originally collected from the network was for 50 users for a
period of one month, unfortunately only 10 users used enough communication
data to support the train and test timelines proposed for this study.
One hundred twenty six user identification experiments (E7, E8, E9) were
conducted using real network data running seven HTM algorithms. Table 25 in
Appendix H shows the configuration for these experiments. For instance, 10
users leveraging 5 days of train data and 1 day worth of test data (5/1).
Twenty four user identification experiments were run using alternate
Markov based algorithms (E6). Forty two experiments (E9) uncovered
shortcomings in the HTM state machines when handling repetitive consecutive
web destinations embedded in the real network input data set. The HTM was
modified to address these shortcomings and the same 42 user identification
experiments (E8), using the same data set, were run to determine if the HTM
accuracy could be improved. Finally, repetitive web destinations occurring at
the exact same time (same timestamp) were removed from the input data set
and the 42 same user identification experiments were run again (E7).
Twenty one experiments which identify users in spite of simulated DOS
attacks (E10) and 21 experiments which identify users in spite of simulated
Phish attacks (E11) were also run using real network data (using parameters
shown in Tables 23, 24).
The inability to collect TCP timestamps from the real cellular network
limited session identification experiments to utilizing synthetically created TCP
timestamps. It thus became necessary to conduct a set of experiments (E12) to
determine how noise introduced by different session identification algorithms
impacts train data and the ensuing inference accuracy of HTMs. Session
Identification experiments were performed by creating training data sets for the
HTM that use one of three session identification algorithms: (1) Source IP, (2)
Sliding Window, (3) TCP Timestamp. The train data set to be modified by the
session identification algorithms uses real network data. The experiments
include a preliminary step which runs the session identification algorithms
against real network data to produce a new altered train data set that is
modified based on the bias introduced by each session identification algorithm
run under conditions that introduce noise. The experiment would then train the
HTM with this altered train data set and use the original real network data as
the test data set. Using the “Source IP” algorithm, all input with the same
source IP address belongs to the same user. The “Sliding Time Window”
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algorithm selects the first (oldest) HTTP request in a time window based on the
source IP address and assign it to user-x, then all subsequent HTTP requests
within the time window for that source IP address, belong to the same user-x.
As long as data is available for user-x within the window over time, then that
session belongs to user-x otherwise that session is assigned to a new user
(source IP address) selected at random based on users who have data falling
within the sliding time window. Note that the sliding window approach
presented in other related literature [4, 46] only specified that requests
occurring together in time belong to the same session. No other detail was
given as to how a specific session was identified among others occurring at
similar times. Thus, the use of the oldest source IP in a given time window as
the seed for identifying a given user is proposed in this paper in support of this
approach. The TCP Timestamp algorithm uses the TCP Time stamp values
within a clock skew window to track different users.
A total of 18 session identification experiments were run where the source
IP and TCP Timestamps leveraged real life scenarios to alter the original train
data set. This was done by random simulation of recycling of the same source
IP address among users as done by NATs and web proxy middle-boxes and by
random simulation of re-attachment of a device with a new source IP as done
when users move across networks. For TCP timestamp, data loss was randomly
simulated by creating holes in the data stream as well as random simulation of
device power off/on. The number of users in these experiments is 5 and 10 for
5 train days, with the following additional experiment parameters: (Source IP) :
10% recycle source IP address and 10% access network re-attaches; (Sliding
Window): Sliding window size in seconds (1, 3, 5, 60); (TCP Timestamp):
10% data loss and 10% device power on/off.
In order to determine if it was possible to further improve HTM user
attribution accuracy with real network data in the presence of real concept drift,
continuous learning logic was added to the HTM. Continuous learning was
implemented by allowing the output of the Max HTM Output layer, which
identifies which HTMx a given observation belongs to, to be sent back to layer
1 of that HTMx so that it can learn that observation. HTMx then during
inference uses a mechanism similar to “playback” to learn the just received
observation across all HTM layers. Two types of continuous learning were
implemented: (1) Continuous Baseline which lets the Max HTM Output Layer
send feedback to the correct HTM that matched the given observation. (2)
Continuous Inference which lets the Max HTM Output Layer send feedback to
the inferred HTM (which could be right or wrong) that matched the given
observation. Twelve user identification experiments (E13) with continuous
learning were conducted for 5 and 10 users using the BottomUP approach run
at HTM layer 3.
In order to determine if continuous learning could improve the HTM
accuracy in spite of DOS or Phish attacks, 6 experiments (E14) were run. These
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experiments were conducted using real network data for 10 users using 5 days’
worth of train data and 2 days’ worth of test data, using the BottomUp Layer 3
HTM algorithm and applying simulated DOS and Phish attacks configured
with the same parameters previously described for these experiments in Tables
23, 24.
4. Results

Due to the large number of experiments conducted for this study only key
results will be reported in this section. Following are key findings from these
experiments:
 HTM algorithms such as Bottom Up and TopTop tend to provide the
highest levels of recall accuracy and scalability among all HTM
algorithms.
 The HTM algorithm Path Probability tends to perform the worst among all
HTM algorithms.
 Alternate Markov chains based algorithms (1st and 3rd Order Markov
Chains, All-K and PPM) perform very poorly in terms of recall accuracy
and recall accuracy scalability compared to HTM algorithms. However,
Alternate Markov Chains based algorithms excel at recognizing their own
train input.
 HTM recall accuracy is strongly influenced by the number of visited web
destinations and the pattern of behavior (which web sited are visited) of
users, specifically:
o Recall accuracy for HTM algorithms improves dramatically
moving from 1000 to 5000 web destinations visited by all users.
Beyond 5000 web destinations accuracy levels off.
o Continuous repetitive patterns (large number of identical web
destinations visited over a very short time window) found in real
network data impact negatively HTM algorithms’ recall accuracy.
o User behavior changes (new web sites visited) from behavior
learned at train time (concept drift) do impact negatively HTM
recall accuracy. Concept drift that splits randomly learned
sequences of web destinations has the most negative impact on
HTM recall accuracy performance.
 Continuous learning does mitigate the negative impact of
concept drift on HTMs’ recall accuracy performance.
 Recall accuracy reported by HTM algorithms at layers 1 and 3 is generally
comparable.
 HTMs tolerate reasonably well noise introduced in test datasets in the form
of DOS or Phish attacks.
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TCP timestamps can be effective in session identification, however if noise
is present in the training data set, experiments showed that the sliding
window algorithm can be a more accurate session identification algorithm

4.1. Results using Synthetic Data Sets

Based on experiment set (E1), alternate MC based algorithms with one day
worth of test data never produced recall accuracy statistics above 42% (see
Table 4 below) and when the test data set consisted of 3 observations, these
algorithms never produced recall statistics over 66% (see Table 5). In contrast,
HTM algorithms produced accuracy statistics (recall statistics) as high as 99%
for a sample of 100 users with one day worth of test data as shown in Table 4
and 99% recall accuracy for a sample of 500 users with 3 observations worth of
test data as shown in Table 5.
Table 4 - 5-100 users, 5000 Destinations, 5 Train Days and 1 Test Day Synthetic Data (E1)
(E1) HTM and Alternate
Variable Number of Observations per user
Algorithms
50 users, 5000
100 users,
5 users, 5000
20 users, 5000
destinations, 5
5000
destinations, 5
destinations, 5
Train/1Test,
destinations
Train/1Test,
Train/1Test,
Ave Recall
,5
Ave Recall
Ave Recall
Train/1Test,
Ave Recall
HTM L1 Simple Ave
0.988
0.91
0.918
0.89
0.99
0.99
0.986
0.96
HTM L1 Bottom Up
0.99
0.98
0.94
0.92
HTM L1Path Probability
0.988
0.91
0.91
0.89
HTM L3 Simple Ave
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.967
HTM L3 Bottom Up
1.00
0.997
0.999
0.986
HTM L 3 TopTop
0.718
0.46
0.38
0.298
HTM L3 Path Probability
0.42
0.125
0.0277
0.0139
First Order MC
0.3579
0.120
0.0277
0.013
Third Order MC
0.42
0.125
0.0277
0.0139
All K=3
0.42
0.125
0.0277
0.0139
PPM

Table 5 - 5-500 users, 5000 destinations, for 5 Train days and 3 Observations for test Synthetic Data (E1)
(E1) HTM and
3 Test Observations /user
Alternate Algorithms
20 users,
50 users,
100 users,
500 users,
5 users,
5000
5000
5000
5000
5000
destinatio
destinations,
destination
destinations,
destinations,
ns, 5
5
s, 5
5
5
Train/1T
Train/1Test,
Train/1Tes
Train/1Test,
Train/1Test,
est, Ave
Ave Recall
t, Ave
Ave Recall
Ave Recall
Recall
Recall
HTM L1 Simple Ave
1.0
0.966
0.886
0.91
0.829
1.0
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.949
HTM L1 Bottom Up
HTM L 1Path
1.0
0.966
0.93
0.946
0.88
Probability
1.0
0.966
0.87
0.91
0.83
HTM L3 Simple Ave
1.0
0.98
0.97
0.976
0.946
HTM L3 Bottom Up
1.0
1.0
0.99
1.0
0.986
HTM L3 TopTop
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(E1) HTM and
Alternate Algorithms

HTM L3 Path
Probability
First Order MC
Third Order MC
All K=3
PPM

3 Test Observations /user
5 users,
5000
destinations,
5
Train/1Test,
Ave Recall

20 users,
5000
destinatio
ns, 5
Train/1T
est, Ave
Recall

50 users,
5000
destinations,
5
Train/1Test,
Ave Recall

100 users,
5000
destination
s, 5
Train/1Tes
t, Ave
Recall

500 users,
5000
destinations,
5
Train/1Test,
Ave Recall

0.53
0.66
0.60
0.66
0.66

0.45
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25

0.366
0.126
0.120
0.126
0.126

0.329
0.069
0.066
0.069
0.069

0.209
0.0186
0.0186
0.0186
0.0186

Why do Markov chains based algorithms perform so poorly in these
experiments? Fig. 9 shows, the PPM statistics for the experiments run with 5
users with results shown in Table 5. The percentage of hits and misses were
computed for all k orders across all users. The PPM algorithm starts at the
highest k order (k=3) and each time the context (input) of size k of the input is
not matched the algorithm scales down to a lower k order (matches a shorter
portion of the input). Fig. 9 shows that the PPM algorithm operates at k order
= 0 about 80% of the time. This means that 80% of the time the PPM algorithm
fails to match its input, applies a penalty to the path probability for the input
and moves down to a lower k order Markov graph until it reaches k order = 0.
This explains the poor performance of PPM and other higher K order
algorithms (3rd Order MC, All-K) and also explains why higher order Markov
chain algorithms have accuracy performance recall output values similar to
lower order Markov chain algorithms.

Figure 9 PPM Matches and Miss Matches per K-Order = 3 (E1)

Accuracy reported by HTM algorithms scales better with increasing
number of users and web destinations than the accuracy reported by alternate
Markov chains based algorithms as shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows the
difference in recall accuracy between experiments(E1, Table 21 Appendix H)
run for 5 and 100 users, with different number of visited web destination (1000,
5000, 10000), over 5 train days and 1 test day using synthetic data. The high
and low recall values of all HTM algorithms and alternate algorithms were
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recorded and the difference between accuracy values for 5 and 100 users was
tabulated. Table 6 shows that HTM algorithms scale better (smaller
differences) than alternate algorithms with a maximum of 13% loss in accuracy
when tracking 1000 web destinations moving from 5 to 100 users compared to
41% loss in accuracy for alternate MC based algorithms running equivalent
experiments. For 5000 and 10,000 web destinations, the scale factor for the
HTM algorithm improves even more and is as low as 1% for high recall values.

Table 6 Recall Accuracy Scaling from 5 up to 100 Users for 5 Train Days and 1 Test Day (E1)
Number of
Scale Factor based on Recall Differences from 5 to 100 Users
Destinations
HTM High
Alternate
Alternate
HTM Low Recall
Recall
Algorithm High
Algorithm Low
Difference
Difference
Recall Difference
Recall Difference
1000
0.13
0.05
0.407
0.342
Destinations
5000
0.01
0.1
0.41
0.35
Destinations
10,000
0.01
0.06
0.41
0.41
Destinations

To further understand how accuracy is specifically impacted by the number
of destinations in the data set. Synthetic data accuracy performance increases
substantially (E1, Table 21 Appendix H) as number of destinations increases
from 1000 to 5000 (from 54% recall accuracy to 99% for 500 users with 5 days
of train data and 3 observations of test data), minimally from 5000 to 10,000.
Synthetic data accuracy scalability measured for increasing number of users
with 5000 web destinations visited (E5) is high for the top 2 best performing
HTM algorithms (BottomUp at layer 1 and TopTop) consistently at 99% recall
accuracy for 150, 250 350, 450, 500 users (see Fig. 10).

Figure 10 Accuracy scalability Synthetic data, 5 Train and 1 Test Days (E5)

Page 29 of 68

The weighted sum based HTM algorithms (BottomUp at layers 1 and 3 and
TopTop ) outperformed all other HTM algorithms. To understand why, let us
compare the average based algorithm to the weighted sum based algorithm.
Consider an observation of size 5 (5 web sites visited) where the input received
by the HTM is <1, 2, 3, 4, 5> which matches 100% of the learned input as 5
distinct nodes (5 sequences each of size 1). That is, for the average HTM
algorithm FFB= 1+1+1+1+1/5 = 1.0 (100%). Now consider the calculation (as
done for the BottomUP algorithm) for the average weighted sum proportional
to the matched input FFB = [(1/5) + (1/5) + (1/5) + (1/5) + (1/5) ] /5 = 1/5
(20%). Now assume a new input <1, 2, 3, 4, 5> which matches 100% of the
learned input as a single sequence of 5 nodes (1 sequence of size 5). In this
case, using the average algorithm FFB= 1/1 = 1 (100%), while using the
average weighted sum algorithm FFB = [5/5]/1 = 1 = (100%). The average
algorithm produces the same recall accuracy whether an entire sequence is
matched or only individual elements of the sequence are matched, while
weighted sum based algorithms give more weight to longer sequences over
shorter ones increasing the discriminating power of the solution.
In order to verify the ability of the HTM to handle noise, several
experiments were conducted. Experiments (E2) using synthetic data with
simulated concept drift via “Random Walk” show a reduction in accuracy of up
to 25%, indicating that the HTM is susceptible to random splitting of learned
sequences. Concept drift which adds new connections at the end of learned
sequences reduces accuracy only by up to 11%. Experiments which simulated
DOS attacks (E3) run across all HTM algorithms with synthetic data reduced
accuracy by up to 11%, while experiments which simulated Phish attacks (E 4)
reduced accuracy only by up to 5%.
4.2. Results using Real Network Data Sets

Experiments were also conducted with real network data collected over a
period of a month from a cellular data network. Train data sets ranged from 5
to 10 days and 1, 2, 3 test days. Results, at first were modest (E9). For instance,
for 5 users with 5 days’ worth of train data and 2 days’ worth of test data
produced results with recall accuracy as high as 81% for HTM algorithms and
10% for Markov chains based algorithms. Visual observation of this data set
showed a high recurrence of repeating continuous patterns of a single
destination (e.g. 48, 48, 48, 48) within observations compared to similar
measurements for synthetic data. This was confirmed by intra-observation
repetitiveness (IOR) measurements which for some users were as high as 94 %,
indicating that within a user observation on average there were 47 repeating
destinations out of 50. Calibration of real network data run against the HTM
also showed poor performance with the best HTM algorithms (ButtomUp and
TopTop) scoring recall accuracy values (for experiments E9 with 5 users, 5
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train and 2 test days’ worth of data) ranging from 71% to 100%. Unexpectedly,
alternate Markov chain algorithms in calibration tests with the same data set
performed very well with the lowest recall accuracy value of 99%. It appears
that alternate Markov chain based algorithms perform well when test and train
data are very similar but when the data set differ as in the user identification
experiments (E6) then recall accuracy scores do not go above 10% .
The HTM was modified (version 2 HTM2++) in the implementation of the
sequence termination condition (TC3) of the HTM spatial and temporal poolers
to account for continuous repeated destinations. The same set of experiments
was repeated (E7) but this time any repeated destinations that occurred at the
exact same time were removed from the real network dataset. The reduction
was applied to all train and test data files and accounted for a total reduction in
repeated destinations of about 35%. The IOR values decreased and recall
accuracy increased. For instance, with real network data for 10 users with 5
train days and 1 test day, IOR decreased by 7% and 9% for train and test data
sets respectively while recall accuracy increased by 8% with the recall
accuracy values shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7. REAL CELLULAR NETWORK DATA RECALL ACCURACY RESULTS (E7)
Train/Test Days

5 Train, 1 Test days
5 Train, 2 Test days
10 Train, 3 Test days

Recall Results from Real Cellular Network using HTM algorithms
5 Users
10 Users High
10 Users Low
High
5 Users Low Recall
Recall
Recall
Recall

0.95
0.90
0.86

0.87
0.79
0.81

0.75
0.78
0.72

0.64
0.61
0.64

To determine if results using 10 users with real network data had
statistical significance we took the experiment from Table 7 using real network
data for 10 users for 5 train days and 1 test day. This experiment produced a
“high” recall accuracy value of 87% (86.7). We repeated the same experiment
30 times, skipping the first 5, 10, 15, 20,.. up to 150 destinations for each
experiment. This mimics starting an experiment at a different place in the real
data stream. The value of α chosen was 0.01, the research hypothesis was that
the recall accuracy over these experiments was greater than 85.8%. The
calculated sample standard deviation was 0.0084, the standard error mean was
0.0015, and the mean was 0.8625, while the z-score was 2.92. These results are
significant at the 0.0018 level.
Why was HTM1 (the original version of the HTM) unable to recognize
repetitive continuous patters? HTM1 broke up repetitive patterns instead of
treating them as sequences. So pattern, 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2,3 was seen as pattern
1,2,3 occurring 3 times (which is good), but sequence 2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2 was seen
as a single destination 2 visited 8 times. This means that a user who seldom
visits destination 2 and another who visits it in a sequence will produce
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analogous similarity statistics since for a single repeating continuous
destination, HTM1 does not see a sequence of destinations but only a single
element. HTM version 2 (HTM2) modifies terminating condition TC3 to
continue to process repeated destinations already in the sequence until a new
destination not already in the sequence is encountered or terminating conditions
TC1 or TC2 are met. In order to understand the recall accuracy improvements
between experiments E9, E8,and E7, Fig. 11 shows the results for user
identification tests run with 5 users with 5 train and 2 test days’ worth of real
data. HTM1 represents version 1 of the HTMs without the fix to address
continuous repetitive patterns (E9), HTM2 is the second version of the HTM
which addresses repetitive continuous patterns but is run on the same real data
set as HTM1 (E8). HTM2++ is HTM2 run on the real data set where web
destinations repeated at the exact same time are removed from the input (E7).
The baseline in Fig. 11 is based on running the experiments on the equivalent
synthetic data set. The association of higher levels of IOR measurements with
the inferior accuracy results was further investigated and experiments were run
(beyond experiments reported in Table 3) with the same data set for 10 users (5
train days/1 test day), this time completely eliminating repeating continuous
patterns of a single destination within observations in the input to determine if
this would further positively impact accuracy results. While IOR continued to
decrease (additional 8% for both train and test data sets), unexpectedly,
accuracy never improved beyond 87%.

Figure 11 - Accuracy comparisons of all HTM versions (E7,E8, E9) including removal of same time
destinations
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While investigating these results further, the real network data set was run
through an algorithm that computed and thus measured concept drift by
converting the concept drift generator for synthetic data to a concept drift
detector for real network data. This concept drift detector identified changed
user behavior in the test data set due to visits to new connections among
existing nodes (CDe ) and new connections to new nodes (CDn) as shown in
Table 8.
TABLE 8. CONCEPT DRIFT MEASURED IN REAL CELLULAR NETWORK DATA (E7)
Train/Test Days
5 Users CDe
existing
connections
5 Train, 1 Test days
5 Train, 2 Test days
10 Train, 3 Test days

0.19
0.20
0.18

Concept Drift (CD) from Real Network Data
10 Users CDe
5 Users CDn
10 Users CDn
existing
new
new connections
connections
connections

0.20
0.21
0.19

0.05
0.07
0.07

0.07
0.09
0.08

The average CDe concept drift is 20% and CDn is 7% which is very similar
to the simulated concept drift levels used for synthetic data. In order to
determine the impact of concept drift on recall accuracy for real network data
experiments, the HTM prototype was further modified to continuously learn
during inference (E13). Preliminary results, using only the BottomUP approach
run at HTM layer 3, show that recall accuracy improves with the real network
data for 5, 10 users for 5 train days and 1, 2, 3 test days. Specifically, recall
accuracy for 5 users improved on average 4% and 2% for continuous baseline
and continuous inference respectively and 6% and 1% respectively for 10 users.
Table 9 shows details of these results.
TABLE 9. RECALL ACCURACY WHEN CONTINUOUS LEARNING IS APPLIED TO REAL NETWORK DATA (E13)
Train/Test
Days

5 Train, 1 Test
days
5 Train, 2 Test
days
10 Train, 3
Test days

Continuous Learning (BottomUp layer3) Recall Results from Real Cellular
Network
5 Users Recall
10 Users Recall
5 Users Recall
10 Users Recall
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Baseline/Normal
Baseline/Normal
Inference/Normal
Inference/Normal

0.983 /0.95

0.931 /0.87

0.983 /0.95

0.899/0.87

0.88/0.876

0.847/0.788

0.868/0.876

0.776/0.788

0.847/0.773

0.826/0.764

0.807/0.773

0.766/0.764

Experiments with real network data which simulated DOS attacks (E10) run
across all HTM algorithms reduced accuracy by up to 8% while experiments
which simulated Phish attacks (E11) reduced accuracy only by up to 4%. Fig. 12
shows the results of (E14) using continuous learning to mitigate the user
attribution effects under a DOS attack. The baseline, “normal” in Fig. 12,
represents experiments run without continuous learning. The results show that
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when a subset of users (four out of ten) is under attack during the inference
phase, it is possible to get improved attribution recognition accuracy (even over
scenarios where no attacks are present) when the HTM algorithm can learn
perfectly (continuous baseline). On the other hand, using inference to select
which sequences to learn during continuous learning (continuous inference)
produces mixed results. DOS attacks conducted during the inference phase
produce decreased recognition accuracy performance when continuous
inference learning is enabled possibly due to the fact that attacked sites were
already learned by this user before the attack took place and do not create new
distinctive patterns. Phish attacks instead produced better recognition accuracy
performance possibly due to the fact that attacked sites were new and not
learned until after the attack making it easier to infer them correctly.

Figure 12 Recall Accuracy using Continuous Learning during DOS and Phish attacks (E14)

4.3. Session Identification Experiment Results

The motivation for conducting session identification experiments is to
determine how much different session identification approaches applied during
HTM training impact the ability of the HTM to infer accurately (when used
under conditions that emulate real life scenarios specific to each session
identification algorithm).
Session Identification experiment results showed that the sliding
window session identification algorithm (which operates normally with some
level of randomness) when measured against “perfect” tracking algorithms
such as source IP address and TCP timestamp (that are exposed to simulated
real life conditions which introduce noise in the data set) can outperform both
of these algorithms. The average recall accuracy for all experiments across 5
and 10 users is shown in Fig. 13. To put things in perspective, a window size of
1 minute, produced a change in the original train data set (loss of web
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destinations) of 57%, yet recall accuracy during inference is reported at 92%
(sliding window worst result), compared to the best performing TCP timestamp
(with 10% data loss and 10% device resets) which reports average recall
accuracy value of 83%. These results warrant further study into the impact of
noise on the session identification algorithms presented in this study.

Figure 13 Aggregate Session Identification Recall Accuracy Results

5. Security and Privacy Considerations

This study addresses the important problem of user attribution leveraging
communication traffic. A relevant property of user attribution as implemented
in this study is that it is privacy preserving with respect to the real identity of
the user. Consider the following real-world scenario where the user attribution
solution described in this paper is deployed in an access network (possibly a
cellular/WIFI operator network or at internet points of presence) and monitors
HTTP traffic. As traffic passes through the user attribution solution (UAS) as
proposed in this paper, the solution learns to recognize users (User 1, User 2,
User 3, …., User N) based on each user’s past communication behavior. After
the learning stage, the UAS can recognize users (inference stage) based on
learned communication patterns when users re-enter the network possibly using
a new source IP address and new authorization credentials without knowing the
user specific identity (User1 is Joe Smith). In the context of security, accuracy
and the (minimal) amount of test data used by HTM algorithms to recognize
users are the key measures of success for the UAS. The majority of
experiments conducted in this study measured recall accuracy; in addition,
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experiments conducted which leveraged just 3 observations in the test data sets
provide good insights on how quickly the user attribution solution proposed in
this study could recognize users.
There are several applications in the area of security that benefit from being
able to address the user attribution problem. Specifically, in the area of
intrusion detection, the HTM-based approach used to identify users can be used
before, during or after an attack has taken place to identify the communication
traffic associated with the user that needs to be stopped or rate limited.
The “user attribution problem” is generic and not tied to attack scenarios,
but it can still be used to recognize and stop malicious users. Consider a second
real-world scenario where the UAS is coupled with an intrusion detection and
prevention system (IDPS) so that both receive the same communication input
but instead of using the source IP address to recognize users (due to the
unreliability of this source), the IDPS uses the user labels (User 1, User 2, User
3…. ,User N) associated with the given input provided by the UAS. The UAS
after it has completed the training phase and it has entered the inference phase
provides user labels to the IDPS. Assume the IDPS (out of scope for this study)
detects anomalous behavior with communication traffic belonging to user4 and
blocks all HTTP traffic associated with this user label. User4, unable to access
the internet decides to re-enter the network next day from a different location,
possibly using a different access network (e.g. WIFI access point instead of a
cellular network). User4 likely using a brand new assigned IP address is able to
access the internet, until the UAS recognizes user4 and passes this user label to
the IDPS which will again block this user before the user can start to perform
malicious activities.
The experiments run in this study show that it is possible to recognize
communication traffic as belonging to a given user even during DOS or phish
attacks originating from mobile devices albeit less effectively. We are not
aware of reported DOS attacks that originate from mobile devices. Operators
do report DOS attacks such as DNS amplification attacks originating from the
internet destined for IP addresses of mobile devices. Such attacks are typically
stopped by operators using firewalls deployed at internet peering points and do
not impact user attribution as defined in this study, since they do not originate
from mobile devices. Analysis of DOS attack traces made available by the
operator where real network data was collected show the typical DOS attack
pattern of extremely high volume of messages, sent within extremely tight time
windows to the same destination IP address. If such attack patterns were to
originate from many mobile devices then the UAS could easily filter them out
(same destinations within the same time stamp) as was done in experiments E7.
What if after an attack occurred, traces of the communication traffic of
many users were analyzed to tie that traffic to a possible physical human? The
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UAS could be trained to recognize communication traffic for users and bind
those users to real humans (user4 is Joe Smith). Like previous examples, the
UAS relies on inference to attribute communication traffic to a given user and
thus it suffers from possible false negative or false positive errors as opposed to
a typical authentication system which relies on fixed tokens like secret
key/passwords/cookies. However, it is highly unlikely that such tokens are
present in the communication traffic collected from communication logs/traces
for user traffic destined to specific web destinations. Even if present, these
security tokens have meaning only to the end systems that issued them.
Because of these reasons the HTM-based approach proposed in this study
could be used to address network forensic investigations.
What if the described scenarios of intrusion detection and network forensic
could only have access to encrypted user traffic data? Would the HTM-based
approach still be able to recognize user communication traffic? Consider the
following three different scenarios: (1) User communication to a secure
network server via IPSEC, (2) User communication to a web server supporting
a secure HTTPS connection, (3) User leveraging the anonymizing Tor network
[16] to communicate with a web server. The answer to the above questions
depend on whether the destination IP address in the encrypted communication
traffic received by the attribution system represents the actual destination that
the user intended to visit. This is possible with IPSEC since the IPSEC tunnel
could terminate at the site being visited, it is likely with HTTPS since the
secure connection terminates at the server being visited, but impossible with
Tor destined traffic since Tor encrypts the original data, including the
destination IP address, several times and sends it through a virtual circuit
comprising successive, randomly selected Tor relays.
What if a strategic attacker, who knows about the attribution system
being in place, takes actions to avoid it? The attribution system monitors
normal traffic and not malicious traffic, assuming that the original user has
possession of the compromised device, then that user would continue to use the
device normally, with normal “concept drift” over time, plus the background
malicious activity. In this case the attribution system has a good chance of
recognizing the user. However, if the malicious activity completely takes over
the device (possibly the device is stolen) then the new malicious user will have
different user behavior and this malicious user would not be recognized by the
attribution system.
Another security application where user attribution as addressed in this
study could be leveraged is in the area of user communication traffic
identification under source spoofing conditions. Assume that spoofing or
impersonation could take place as two users call or message each other. In this
case, the sequence of destinations (numbers called or messaged to) originating
from a potential impersonator are run against HTMs which are trained with
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sequences of destinations accessed by valid users. These sequences would be
identified as being spoofed if the HTM inferred user (associated with these
learned sequences) does not match the reported originating user. For instance,
assume that for Voice over IP (VOIP) scenarios the HTM at train time
monitors SIP INVITE messages which identify calls originating from user1. At
train time the HTM learns that user1 calls <user2, user5, user8> in that order.
Assume that user1 is being impersonated and the impersonating user1 calls
<user5, user8, user2>, then this call pattern is not likely to match user1 (the
reported originating user in the SIP INVITE message) call patterns and thus
user1 would be identified as a possible impersonator. Note that even if the
impersonator were to guess the right sequence order of users to call, it is not
guaranteed that the HTM would be fooled into identifying the impersonating
user1 as the authentic user1. This is because the HTM learns the inter
destination arrival rate TC2 for all learned sequences. This means that if the
HTM learned the following sequence <user2, user5, user8> for user1 and for
another user4 it learned sequence <user5, user8>, then the impersonating user1
could call the same users as the original user1 but with different inter arrival
times so that two sequences could be generated: <user2>, <user5, user8>. In
this case user4, different from the originating user1 reported in the SIP INVITE
message, would be identified as matching the input sequences and user1 would
again be identified as an impersonator. Session identification, however, would
likely leverage a different identification approach for the VOIP scenarios than
what has been proposed in this study. Assuming that the train data set is trusted,
the originating user is identified in the SIP INVITE message (“FROM/Contact”
SIP headers) and this tracking header can be used to create user sessions,
instead of using the TCP timestamps. This session identification approach
works especially well when SIP INVITE messages ride over the UDP protocol
which cannot use the TCP timestamp.
6. Limitations

The following sections describe implementation constraints faced during the
experimentation phase as well as envisioned challenges faced using the TCP
timestamp approach.
6.1. Limitations in Implementation

The HTM prototype was completely written in Java. The performance
scalability of HTMs measured in terms of run-time and space (memory needed
at run-time) was a challenge in this study which limited the experiments to a
maximum of 500 users. All experiments were executed on a Quad i7-3820QM
2.7-3.7 GHz with 16Gig RAM laptop. Threading (one thread per HTM) and
caching (of already computed results derived by performing inference traversal
of the Markov chains within each layer of the HTM) were two techniques that
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considerably improved the inference performance of the HTM allowing
completing the experiments for 500 users in reasonable times. When first
implemented threads improved run-time performance by almost 100% so that
running the HTM algorithms for 2 users would take about 30 minutes to
complete in single threaded mode but using multiple threads the experiment
would complete in 16 minutes. By adding caching of results of Markov chain
searches, performance dropped from 16 minutes to 6 minutes for the same set
of experiments. Further optimizations in how threads were used (limiting the
number of concurrent threads to 8) and other enhancements in the cache
algorithms to maximize cache hits and minimize collisions resulted in run
times of 16 minutes to 1 hour and 15 minutes for 5 to 100 users using 5 days’
worth of synthetic train data and 1 day worth of test data and 7 minutes to 5
hours for 5 to 500 users for 5000 destinations using 5 days’ worth of synthetic
train data and 3 observations worth of test data. In contrast, the highest run time
for alternate Markov chain based algorithms was 3 minutes for equivalent tests
which involved 500 users. Alternate Markov chains algorithms have much
better run times since discovery of the start of the input sequence is determined
in constant time and matching of the sequence against the “context” occurs in
time proportional to the size of the input since all alternate Markov chain
algorithms are based on extensions of a 1st order Markov graph which matches
the input completely based on the on the very first web destination in the
sequence. HTM algorithms on the other hand have search run times that are
proportional to the size of the entire input (all sequences) learned at training
time as well as the size of the input sequence since HTMs perform an
exhaustive search of all Markov chains at each HTM layer.
The amount of runtime memory needed by HTMs also proved to be a
limiting factor in being able to extend experiments beyond 500 users. The
HTM was run with a JVM setting of 14 gigabytes of RAM but a limiting factor
of the HTM design is the need for the MAX HTM Output layer (as shown in
Fig. 8) to receive and hold one observation’s worth of feed forward beliefs
from each HTM before being able to decide which HTM has the “best” feed
forward belief. Increasing the number of users increases the number of HTMs
which also increases the amount of RAM main memory needed to run the
experiment. When the Java JVM starts to run out of the allocated RAM
memory and starts to use hard drive virtual memory, run-time performance
deteriorates dramatically eventually preventing forward progress.
6.2. Limitations in Approach

There are a few limitations tied to the use of TCP timestamps as a
communication session identification algorithm. In this study, the TCP
timestamp session identification is used in two situations. The first occurs
during training of an HTM when session identification is used to identify up to
50 observations as belonging to a given source associated with a specific HTM
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representing a given user. The second occurs during inference when session
identification is used to create anonymous sessions for each observation which
are distributed to all HTMs so that each HTM can perform inference on the
observation to determine how well the observation matches learned input for
each HTM. During the training phase the following scenarios are not allowed
as they will corrupt the training data set:
 A single user leveraging multiple devices
 Many users sharing the same device
 The user recycling the device.
A single user using multiple devices at training time would appear as many
different sources and thus one HTM would be created for each source. This is a
problem because each HTM created at train time identifies a different user
when actually training is occurring for only one user. When many users share
the same device at train time, the sessions produced are corrupted. These
sessions will include data from multiple users and would thus not be
representative of any given user. When a user recycles his/her device, the TCP
timestamp is reset and this user session will appear as a new source and thus
would incorrectly cause a new HTM to be created, thus identifying a new, nonexisting user. During the inference phase when anonymous sessions are created
only the second scenario is disallowed as the multiple users sharing the same
device will create individual sessions with corrupted data belonging to multiple
users. During the inference phase a user can use one device to train the HTM
and a different device to perform inference. In addition, during inference, when
anonymous sessions are created, the device under test can be recycled, as long
as partial sessions (containing less than 50 observations) produced because
recycling interrupts creation of the previous observation, are discarded. In
general, the effect of a recycling device is the restart of a TCP IP connection
which resets the TCP timestamp’s TS value. TCP connections are also reset
when TCP connections go through middle boxes (Web proxies, NATs,
Firewalls, Load Balancers) which split a single TCP connection from device to
origin server into two TCP connections; one connection from the device to the
middle box and the other from the middle box to the origin server.
If the TCP approach has the reported limitations why was this approach
chosen for this study? The TCP timestamp approach provides a reliable way to
“track” user communication sessions in a way that is independent of the
location or network a device attaches to, thus enabling support for mobility.
The authors believe that in real life scenarios, users recycle their mobile
devices infrequently, and do not share their personal mobile devices with others.
Another practical challenge with the use of TCP timestamp is due to the
possibility of loss of tracking accuracy due to clock skew, approaches to
address these challenges were presented in the “Session Identification” section.
A final limitation brought to bear in this study is found in experiments (E14)
where DOS attacks during user identification experiments are countered by
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using “continuous learning”. The results show consistent worse recall accuracy
performance when using continuous inference learning. This leads to the
observation that continuous learning can improve user identification recall
accuracy in the presence of “concept drift” but when presented with repeated
continuous patters found in typical DOS attacks, it can perform poorly.
6.3. Further Research Directions

An assumption made in this study is that users can be identified by learning
web sites they visit. An interesting extension of this idea would be to study the
user attribution problem in the context of peer-to-peer communication as is the
case for messaging and voice calls. A key question would be: Can users be
identified based on peer-to-peer patterns of communication? A related question
would be: Is the power law at work in peer-to-peer communication scenarios as
well? That is, do people tend to communicate (message or call) with a few set
of users very often and with many other users infrequently? The security
implications of extending the user attribution problem to cover peer-to-peer
communication scenarios are especially relevant in the area of detection of
spoofing of sources in peer-to-peer communication (e.g. recently RFC 7375
“Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model” has defined voice attacks where the
calling party can be impersonated by an attacker).
As mobility will continue to dominate our future and as the internet of
people becomes the internet of things, the user attribution problem will
eventually morph into a device/user attribution problem. It would be interesting
to run experiments that utilize all communication traffic originating from a
device, not just HTTP traffic, to extend the attribution problem from a user to a
source (device/user).
Due to the promising results achieved in this study it is important to
extend experiments that seek to improve recall accuracy utilizing a larger realnetwork data set studying further the impact on user identification accuracy of
techniques like continuous learning. The HTM framework will be made
available to researchers who wish to extend this work by contacting the authors.
7. Conclusions

The user attribution problem is an old problem that just recently has
received the attention of the research community. This problem is very
important in the field of security since if one cannot attribute communication
traffic to a specific user in a network then one cannot identify the user to
determine if that user is performing malicious activities in that network or even
more importantly stop/prevent the user from continuing to perform such
activity. This is the first study that addresses the user attribution problem in the
context of complex networks where mobility is dominant using an extensive set
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of experiments which used both synthetic and real network data. The approach
leveraged behavior based identification using HTMs to extend the research of
Herrmann and Yang [25, 46]. This research, acknowledges the limitations of
traditional tracking identifiers such as cookies and source IP addresses, and
introduces TCP timestamps as a new session identification algorithm used to
identify communication sessions for mobile users. Results from the
experiments conducted in this study are promising. HTMs outperform
traditional Markov chains based approaches and can provide high levels of
identification accuracy using synthetic data with 99% recall accuracy for up to
500 users and good levels of recall accuracy of 95 % and 87% for 5 and 10
users respectively when using cellular network data. Performance was further
improved with recall accuracy results of 98% and 90% for 5 and 10 users
respectively by implementing continuous learning enabled during inference
within HTMs to address the challenge of concept drift found in real cellular
networks.
This research has made several contributions in the approach used by
extending the hierarchical temporal memory model originally proposed in [19]
which was not designed to support sequences and showed that sequence based
hierarchical memories can consistently provide higher levels of identification
accuracy with higher levels of accuracy scalability than traditional Markov
chains. The following represent contributions from this research designed to
improve HTM inference accuracy:
 This study implements sequence inference using a novel technique
which combines traditional variable order Markov chains with the use
of longest common subsequence and longest common substring
coupled with the persistence of learned sequences to support seven new
HTM inference algorithms.
 This study introduces the concept of sequence cloning to improve the
learning and inference accuracy of Markov chains and of HTMs.
 This study introduces the concept of playback to distribute accurately
learned sequences from lower to higher layers of the HTM. This
reduces learning times and improves inference accuracy in hierarchical
models like HTMs.
This study also provides insights into the impact to recall accuracy of
the power law distribution at work in complex networks which creates high
levels repetition of popular web sites in the data set. The impact to recall
accuracy of noise in the data set was studied in the context of simulation of
malicious activities and the simulation and observation of context drift in a real
network. Experiment results suggest that while partial elimination from the
data set of continuous repetition of popular web sites improves accuracy results,
complete elimination of such repetition does not produce further improvements.
Instead, addressing concept drift found in real networks shows promise as an
area of further research for improving attribution accuracy performance.
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9. Appendix A – Example of HTM creation during the Training Phase

The examples in this section and in Appendix B assume that
contiguous repetitive sequences (e.g. <48,48,48,48>) are treated as multiple
sequences of size 1 based on terminating condition TC3 (e.g.
<48>,<48>,<48>,<48>) which reflects the implementation in version 1 of the
HTM (HTM1 in experiments E9 found in Table 3).
In order to get a better idea of how beliefs propagate up the HTM
network layers, this section of the paper shows what happens during playback
of input learned in layer 1 of the HTM as represented in the Markov graph and
Markov chains shown in Fig.14 in Appendix B. Input received at layer 1 by the
spatial pooler is organized into sequences with the temporal pooler computing
corresponding feed forward beliefs as shown in Table 10. Note that during
playback the feed forward belief vector only indicates the matched temporal
group (in contrast with the inference phase where feed forward beliefs also
record the degree of membership value).
Table 10 Learned Input Sequences at HTM Layer 1 with generated FFBs
Sequences Learned
S1,S2,S3,S4
S1,S2,S5
S1,S3,S6
S1,S3,S6
T1,T2,T3
T1,T3,T5
T6,T5,T7
S3,S7,S6,S1
H-L1,H-L2
H-L1
H-L1,H-L3
H-L1
H-L1, H-L2, H-L3
UL1, UL2, UL3, UL4
S2,S6,S5
S1,S8,S6

Feed Forward Beliefs
λ<g1,g2,g3,g4,g5,g6>
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,0,0,0,g5,0>
λ<0,0,0,0,g5,0>
λ<0,0,0,0,0,g6>
λ<0,0,g3,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,0,0,g4,0,0>
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>

After layer 1 completes initial training, layer 1 starts playback of
learned sequences towards layer 2. The spatial pooler at layer 2 maps feed
forward beliefs from layer 1 into sequence of coincidences using the sequence
termination rules TC1-3 previously described to combine input into sequences as
shown in Table 11.

Page 46 of 68

Table 11 HTM Layer 2 learned Coincidences
Feed Forward Beliefs
from Layer 1
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>

Coincidences
g2  C1 (new
coincidence)
C1
C1
C1
g5 C2 (new
coincidence)
C2
g6  C3 (new
coincidence)
g3  C4 (new
coincidence)
g1  C5 (new
coincidence)
C5
C5
C5
C5
g4  C6 (new
coincidence)
C1
C1

λ<0, g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0, g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0, g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,0,0,0,g5,0>
λ<0,0,0,0,g5,0>
λ<0,0,0,0,0,g6>
λ<0,0,g3,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,0,0,g4,0,0>
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>
λ<0,g2,0,0,0,0>

Sequences of Coincidences for
Layer2
C1
C1
C1
C1, C2

C2, C3, C4, C5
C5
C5
C5

C5, C6, C1
C1

Having completed initial learning, layer 2 then would convert the
received coincidences into the Markov Graph and Markov chains as shown
below in Fig. 15. Assuming that initial learning is completed at layer 2, layer 2
starts playback in order to train layer 3 as shown in Table 12.
Table 12 Learned Input Sequences at HTM Layer 2 with generated FFBs
Sequences Learned
C1
C1
C1
C1 C2
C2, C3, C4, C5
C5
C5
C5

Feed Forward Beliefs
λ<g1,g2,g3>
λ<g1,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0>
λ<0,g2,0>
λ<0,g2,0>
λ<0,g2,0>
λ<0,g2,0>

C5, C6, C1
C1

λ<0,0,g3>
λ<g1,0,0>

Finally, the spatial pooler at layer 3 converts feed forward beliefs
received from layer 2 into sequence of coincidences using the terminating
condition rules previously described to combine coincidences into sequences of
coincidences as shown in Table 13. Fig. 16 shows layer 3 Markov chains.
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Table 13 HTM Layer 3 Learned Coincidences
Feed Forward
Beliefs
λ<g1,0,0>
λ< g1,0,0>
λ<g1,0,0>
λ< g1,0,0>
λ<0, g2,0>
λ<0,g2,0>
λ<0,g2,0>
λ<0,g2,0>
λ<0,0,g3>
λ< g1,0,0>

Coincidences
g1  C1 new
coincidence
C1
C1
C1
g2  C2 new
coincidence
C2
C2
C2
g3  C3 new
coincidence
C1

Sequences of Coincidences for
Layer3
C1
C1
C1
C1, C2
C2
C2
C2, C3
C1

10. Appendix B – Examples of HTM Inference calculations and FFBs propagation

In order to understand how feed forward beliefs propagate through HTM
layers during inference consider the following example. Fig.14 represents
Markov chains at layer 1 of the HTM created during the training phase based
on the following input sequences (see Table 10 in Appendix A) received in this
order during inference: <S1,S2,S3,S4>, < S1,S2,S5>, < S1,S3,S6>, <
S1,S3,S6>, < T1,T2,T3>, < T1,T3,T5>, < T6,T5,T7>, < S3,S7,S6,S1>, < HL1,H-L2>, < H-L1>, <H-L1,H-L3>, < H-L1>, < H-L1, H-L2, H-L3>, < UL1,
UL2, UL3, UL4>, < S2,S6,S5>, <S1,S6,S8>. These sequences were collected
by the spatial pooler based on the sequence terminating conditions TC1-3 (for
this example the max allowed sequence size is 4) previously defined. During
the learning phase a single Markov graph is created which is then split into
multiple Markov chains based on the algorithm shown in Fig.6.
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Figure 14 Example HTM Layer 1 Markov Chains

Assume that during the inference stage the following input sequences
are processed in time order by layer 1 of the HTM: <S1,S3>, <S3,S6>,
<T1,T2,T3>, <T6,T9>, <S7,S1>, <HL1,HL2,HL3>, <UL1, UL2, UL4>,
<UL1,UL3>, <S1, S2>, <S1>. Table 14 was created from these inputs based on
the FFB calculations from Table 1 applied against the Markov chains in Fig.14.
Also assume that the HTM algorithm used is neither the Path probability nor
the ButtomUP algorithm.
Input Sequence(IS)
to HTM Layer 1
<S1,S3>
<S3,S6>
<T1,T2,T3>
<T6,T9>
<S7,S1>
<HL1,HL2,HL3>
<UL1, UL3, UL4>
<UL1,UL3>
<S1, S2>
<S1>

Table 14 Feed Forward Belief calculations for HTM Layer 1
Sequence
Sequence
Degree of
λL2
Similarity
Persistence
Membership
(SS)
(SP)
(DM)
0.99
0.00125
0.99
<0,0.99,0,0,0,0>
0.66
0.00125
0.66
<0,0.66,0,0,0,0>
0.99
0.000625
0.99
<0,0,0,0,0.99,0>
0.33
0.000625
0.33
<0,0,0,0,0,0.33>
0.37
0.000625
0.37
<0,0,0.37,0,0,0>
0.99
0.000625
0.99
<0.99,0,0,0,0,0>
0.62
0.000625
0.62
<0,0,0,0.62,0,0>
0.37
0.000625
0.37
<0,0,0,0.37,0,0>
0.99
0.000625
0.99
<0,0.99,0,0,0,0>
0.99
0.00125
0.99
<0,0.99,0,0,0,0>

Markov
Chain
Matched
g2
g2
g5
g6
g3
g1
g4
g4
g2
g2
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The calculations below refer to Table 14 as applied at HTM layer 1 to
the Markov chains in Fig.14.











IS = <S1,S3> then LLS = <S1,S3,S6>, SS = (1×0.495) + (1×0.495) = 0.99,
SP = (2/16 × 0.01), DM=SS=.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1,0.991) = 0.99
IS = <S3,S6> then LLS = <S1,S3,S6>, SS = (2/3 × 0.495) + (2/3 × 0.495)
=0.66, SP = (2/16 × 0.01), DM = SS=0.66, λL2 = FFB = min(1,0.661) = 0.66
IS = <T1,T2,T3> then LLS = <T1,T2,T3>, SS = (1×0.495) + (1 × 0.495) =
0.99, SP = (1/16× 0.01), DM= SS=0.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1, 0.991) = 0.99
IS = <T6,T9> then LLS = <T6,T5,T7>, SS=(1/3 × 0.495) + (1/3 × 0.495) =
0.33, SP = (1/16× 0.01), DM=SS=0.33, λL2 = FFB = min(1, 0.331) = 0.33
IS = <S7,S1> then LLS = <S3,S7,S6,S1>, SS= (2/4 × 0.495) + (1/4 × 0.495)=
0.37, SP = (1/16× 0.01), DM=SS=0.37, λL2 = FFB = min(1, 0.371) = 0.37
IS = <HL1,HL2,HL3> then LLS = <HL1,HL2,HL3>, SS= (3/3 × 0.495) +
(3/3 × 0.495) = 0.99, SP = (1/16× 0.01), DM=SS=0.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1,
0.991) = 0.99
IS = <UL1, UL3, UL4> then LLS = <UL1, UL2, UL3,UL4>, SS= (3/4 ×
0.495) + (2/4 × 0.495) = 0.617, SP = (1/16 × 0.01), DM = SS=0.617 , λL2 =
FFB = min(1,0.6176 ) = 0.62
IS = <UL1,UL3> then LLS= <UL1, UL2, UL3,UL4>, SS= (2/4 × 0.495) +
(1/4 × 0.495) = 0.37, SP = (1/16 × 0.01), DM = SS=0.37, λL2 = FFB =
min(1,0.371) = 0.37
IS = <S1, S2> then LLS = <S1,S2,S5>, SS= (2/2 × 0.495) + (1/2 × 0.495) =
0.99, SP = (1/16 × 0.01), DM = SS=0.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1,0.991) = 0.99
IS = <S1> then LLS = <S1,S3,S6>, SS= (1/1 × 0.495) + (1/1 × 0.495) = 0.99,
SP = (2/16 × 0.01), DM =(SS,SP)=0.99, λL2 = FFB = min(1,0.991) = 0.99

The feed forward beliefs from layer 1 travel to layer 2 as shown in
Table 15 below. The mapping of temporal groups gi to coincidences Ci was
established during the learn phase and is shown in Table 11 in Appendix A.
Layer 2 input sequences (coincidences) are created based on terminating
conditions TC1 and TC3.
Table 15 HTM Layer 2 Mapping of Feed Forward Beliefs to Coincidences

λL2
λ<g1,g2,g3,g4,g5,g6>

Maps to
Layer 2
Coincidence

Layer 2
Input
Sequence
(IS)

Sgi

Layer1
FFBgi
from λL2

Layer 2
IALSgi..i..i+N

<0,0.99,0,0,0,0>
<0,0.66,0,0,0,0>
<0,0,0,0,0.99,0>
<0,0,0,0,0,0.33>
<0,0,0.37,0,0,0>

g2 C1
C1
g5  C2
g6  C3
g3  C4

< C1>

Sg2

0.99

< C1, C2, C3,
C 4>

Sg2563

0.99
0.66
0.99
0.33
0.37

<0.99,0,0,0,0,0>
<0,0,0,0.62,0,0>
<0,0,0,0.37,0,0>
<0,0.99,0,0,0,0>
<0,0.99,0,0,0,0>

g1  C5
g4  C6
C6
g2 C1
C2

< C5, C6>

Sg14

< C6, C1>
< C2>

Sg42
Sg2

0.99
0.62
0.37
0.99
0.99

0.5875
0.805
0.68
0.99
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The HTM layer 2 input activation level (IAL) calculations from Table
15 are shown below:
 IALSg2 = 0.99/1 = 0.99
 IALSg2563 = [0.66 + 0.99 + 0.33 + 0.37]/4 = 0.5875
 IALSg14 = [0.99 + 0.62]/2 = 0.805
 IALSg42 = [0.37 + 0.99]/2 = 0.68
 IALSg2 = 0.99/1 = 0.99
Layer 2 of the HTM was created during the training phase (see Table 11 in
Appendix A) and is shown below.

Figure 15 Example HTM Layer 2 Markov Chains

The feed forward beliefs generated at layer 2 to be sent to layer 3 are
computed as shown in Table 16.

Input Sequence(IS)
to HTM Layer 2
< C1>
< C1, C2, C3, C4>
< C5, C6>
< C6, C1>
< C2>

Table 16 Feed Forward Belief calculations for HTM Layer 2
Sequence
Sequence
Degree of
λL3
Similarity
Persistence
Membership
(SS)
(SP)
(DM)
0.99
0.004
0.99
<0.98,0,0>
0.74
0.001
0.74
<0,0.43,0>
0.99
0.001
0.99
<0,0,0.80>
0.66
0.001
0.66
<0,0,0.45>
0.99
0.001
0.99
<0,0.98,0>

Markov
Chain
Matched
g1
g2
g3
g3
g2

Table 16 above was created based on the following calculations applied against
the Markov chains in Fig.15:


IS = <C1> then LLS = <C1>, SS = (1×0.495) + (1×0.495) = 0.99, SP = (4/10
× 0.01), DM=SS=0.99, λL3 = FFB × IAL = min(1,0.994) × 0.99 = 0.98
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IS = <C1,C2,C3,C4> then LLS = <C2,C3,C4,C5>, SS = (3/4 × 0.495) +
(3/4×0.495) = 0.74, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=SS=0.74, λL3 = FFB × IAL =
min(1,0.741) × 0.5875 = 0.435
IS = <C5,C6> then LLS = <C5,C6,C1>, SS = (2/2 × 0.495) + (2/2 × 0.495) =
0.99, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=SS=0.99, λL3 = FFB × IAL = min(1,0.991) ×
0.805 = 0.796
IS = <C6,C1> then LLS = <C5,C6,C1>, SS = (2/3 × 0.495) + (2/3 × 0.495) =
0.66, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=SS=0.66, λL3 = FFB × IAL = min(1,0.661) ×
0.68 = 0.449
IS = <C2> then LLS = < C2,C3,C4,C5>, SS = (1 × 0.495) + (1 × 0.495) =
0.99, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=SS=0.99, λL3 = FFB × IAL = min(1,0.991) ×
0.99 = 0.98

Layer 3 of the HTM was created during the training phase and is shown below.

Figure 16 HTM Layer 3 Markov Chains

The feed forward beliefs from layer 2 travel to layer 3 as shown in the
Table 17 below. The mapping of temporal groups gj to coincidences Cj was
established during the training phase and is shown in Table 13 in Appendix A.
Table 17 HTM Layer 3 Mapping of Feed Forward Beliefs to Coincidences

λL3
λ<g1,g2,g3>

Maps to
Layer 3
Coincidence

Layer 3
Input
Sequence
(IS)

<0.98,0,0>
<0,0.43,0>
<0,0,0.80>
<0,0,0.45>
<0,0.98,0>

g1 C1
g2 C2
g3 C3
g3 C3
g2 C2

C1
C2
< C1, C2,C3>
C3
< C3, C2>

Sgj

Sg123
Sg23

Layer 2
(FFBgi ×
IALSgi..i..i+N )
from λL3
0.98
0.43
0.80
0.45
0.98

Layer 3
IALSgj..j+N

0.737
0.715

The HTM layer 3 input activation level (IAL) calculations from Table
17 are shown below:
 IALSg123 = [0.98 × 0.43 × 0.80]/3 = 0.737
 IALSg23 = [0.45 + 0.98]/2 = 0.715
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The feed forward beliefs generated at layer 3 to be sent to the Max Output layer
are computed as shown below.

Input Sequence(IS)
to HTM Layer 3
< C1, C2,C3>
< C3, C2>

Table 18 Feed Forward Belief calculations for HTM Layer 3
Sequence
Sequence
Degree of
λOutput
Similarity
Persistence
Membership
(SS)
(SP)
(DM)
0.66
0.001
0.66
0.49
0.495
0.002
0.495
0.355

Markov
Chain
Matched
g1,g2
g1

The calculations below belong to table 18 based on the Makov chains
of HTM layer 3 in Fig.16.




IS = <C1,C2,C3> then LLS = <C1,C2> and <C2,C3> since DM(C1,C2) =
DM(C2,C3) and SP(C1,C2) = SP(C2,C3), SS = (2/3×0.495) + (2/3×0.495) =
0.66, SP = (1/10 × 0.01), DM=(SS,SP)=0.66, λOutput = FFB × IAL =
min(1,0.661) × 0.737 = 0.49
IS = <C3,C2> then LLS = <C2> since DM(C2) = DM(C1,C2) = DM(C2,C3)
and SP(C2) > SP(C1,C2) and SP(C2,C3), SS = (1/2×0.495) + (1/2×0.495) =
0.495, SP = (2/10 × 0.01), DM=(SS,SP)=0.495 , λOutput = FFB × IAL =
min(1,0.497) × 0.715 = 0.355

At layer 3 λOutput is sent directly to the Max Output layer, but for layers
1 and 2 the matched Markov chain is used as an index into vectors λ2 and λ3.
Since it is possible to match more than one Markov chain as shown for input
sequence <C1, C2, C3> the single chosen Markov chain is non-deterministic
(HTM implementation dependent).
11. Appendix C – Example of Longest Common Subsequence Computation

Consider the following examples to illustrate the use of formulas (1) LCSm and
(2) LCSUm
1.

2.

3.

Let IS = <a,b,c> and let cLLS = <a,b,c,d,x> then
a. LCS(IS,cLLS) = <a,b,c>, IS1 = <a>, cLLS1 = <a>, |IS| = 3, |cLLS| =
5, ALLL(IS,cLLS) = |IS| = 3, |LCS(IS,cLLS)| = 3
b. LCSm(IS,cLLS) = 3/3, LCSu(IS,cLLS) = <a,b,c>,| LCSu(IS,cLLS) |
= 3, LCSUm = 3/3
Let IS = <a,m,c> and let cLLS = <a,b,c,d,x> then
a. LCS(IS,cLLS) = <a,c>, IS1 = <a>, cLLS1 = <a>, |IS| = 3, |cLLS| = 5,
ALLL(IS,cLLS) = max(IS,cLLS) = 5, |LCS(IS,cLLS)| = 2
b. LCSm(IS,cLLS) = 2/5, LCSu(IS,cLLS) = <a> and <c>, | LCSu| = 1,
LCSUm = 1/5
Let IS = <b,c> and let cLLS = <a,b,c,d,x> then
a. LCS(IS,cLLS) = <b,c>, IS1 = <b>, cLLS1 = <a>, |IS| = 2, |cLLS| = 5,
ALLL(IS,cLLS) = max(IS,cLLS) = 5, |LCS(IS,cLLS)| = 2
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b.

LCSm(IS,cLLS) = 2/5, LCSu(IS,cLLS) = <bc> , | LCSu| = 2, LCSUm
= 2/5

The best match is achieved with example (1) since all of the input sequence
is matched against the learned sequence. The next best match is example (3)
which matches all of the input but not from the beginning of the learned
sequence. The worst match is example (2) which matches part of the input,
albeit from the beginning of the learned sequence.
12. Appendix D – Computing Path Probability

Assume that each element of sequence LLS has its path probability
computed according to equations (11, 12) and probability values stored in table
Learned_LLS_Nodes, as shown in Fig.17. Then ComputePathProbability
computes the path probability of IS based on sequence LLS as shown in Fig.17.
ComputePathProbability(input, Learned_LLS_Nodes)
// Compute the path probability of the input from the LLS applying appropriate penalties
//for mismatches as follows:
Path_prob = 1.0
For each element “e” of the input (IS) Do
IF match is found between “e” and learned_LLS_Nodes[i] at the next matched
consecutive position “i” in sequence LLS
THEN // Condition (12.a)
Path_prob = Path_prob * learned_LLS_Nodes[i].probability
Else IF “e” does not match any elements in learned_LLS_Nodes from position i OR “e”
matches an already matched element of learned_LLS_Nodes
THEN // Condition (12.b)
// Penalize this input element
Path_prob = Path_prob * PENALTY
ELSE IF a match is found between “e” and learned_LLS_Nodes[j] not at the next
matched consecutive position
THEN // Condition (12.c)
// Elements exist in the learned LLS at a position “j” beyond elements at
// position “i” (last matched element) in the learned LLS that are not part of
// the input  Penalize them
Path_prob = Path_prob * learned_LLS_Nodes[i].probability * (j - i )
* PENALTY
EndIF
EnDo
Figure 17 Path Probability Algorithm

For instance, assume IS = <S1, S3, S4> then from Fig.14 LLS = <S1,S3,S6>

then

P(LLS1) = P(LLS start →S1) = 4/16 since LLS1 == IS1 from (11)
P(LLS2) = P(LL S1→S3) = P(LLS2| LLS1)= 2/4
since LLS2 == IS2 from condition (12.a)
P(LLS3) = penalty = 0.0001 since LLS3 ≠ IS3 from condition (12.b)
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P(LLS) = 4/16 × 2/4 × 0.0001

Another example consider IS = <S1,S4> and assume that
<S1,S2,S3,S4> then

LLS =

P(LLS1) = P(LLS start →S1) = 4/16 since LLS1 == IS1 from (11)
P(LLS2) = P(LLS3) = penalty = (0.0001 × 2)
since IS2 == LLS4 from condition (12.c)
P(LLS) = 4/16 × (0.0001 × 2)

Another example consider IS = <H1,H4,H5,H2> then from Fig.14 LLS
=<H1,H2> then
P(LLS1)
P(LLS2)
P(LLS3)
P(LLS4)
P(LLS)

= P(LLS start →H1) = 5/16 since LSS1 == IS1 from (11)
= penalty = 0.0001 since IS2 ≠ LLS2 from condition (12.b)
= penalty = 0.0001 since IS3 ≠ LLS2 from condition (12.b)
= P(LLS H1→H2) = 2/5 since IS4 == LLS2 from condition (12.a)
= 4/16 × 0.0001 × 0.0001 × 2/5

The first example produces the best match. The second example produces
the second best match and the third example the worst match. Compare these
results to utilization of longest common sequence and longest common
substring calculations and the results are different. When using equations feed
forward belief calculations 1 and 2, the second example produces the best
match while the first example produces the second best result and the third
example produces the worst result. Equations 1 and 2 reward matching all
elements of the input sequence IS, whereas the probability based computations
are more sensitive to any mismatch between input and learned sequence.
Another way to look at it, is that longest common based algorithms of
similarity match the input more “loosely” than probability based algorithms.
13. Appendix E – Understanding HTM Algorithms

To understand how HTM algorithms work consider the following
example where input to the Max Output layer is generated during inference for
two HTMs (HTMA, HTMB, see Table 19) from the same observation (made up
of several input sequences totaling 50 web destinations).
Table 19 Feed Forward Beliefs with associated input received at Max Output Layer

HTMA λOutputK
0.45
0.76
0.22
0.35
0.44
0.77

HTMA matched
input sequence (ISk)
size
1
5
5
3
2
5

HTMB λOutputK
0.99
0.35
0.65
0.78
0.44
0.96

HTMB matched
input sequence (ISk)
5
4
3
5
4
5
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0.85
0.31
0.56
0.30
0.66
0.94
0.29










4
5
5
5
3
2
5

0.84
0.47
0.24
0.67
0.52
0.72

4
4
3
3
5
5

Average HTMA = (0.45 + 0.76 + 0.22 + 0.35 + 0.44 + 0.77 + 0.85 + 0.31 +
0.56 + 0.30 + 0.66 + 0.94 + 0.29)/50 = 6.9/50=0.138
Average HTMB = (0.99 + 0.35 + 0.65 + 0.78 + 0.44 + 0.96 + 0.84 + 0.47 +
0.24 + 0.67 + 0.52 + 0.72)/50 = 7.63/50= 0.1526
Weighted Ave HTMA = [0.45×(1/50)] + [0.76× (5/50)] + [0.22 × (5/50)] +
[0.35 × (3/50)] + [0.44 × (2/50)] + [0.77 × (5/50)] + [0.85 × (4/50)] + [0.31 ×
(5/50)] + [0.56 × (5/50)] + [0.30 × (5/50)] + [0.66 × (3/50)] + [0.94 × (2/50)] +
[0.29× (5/50)] = 0.5138
Weighted Ave HTMB = [0.99 ×(5/50)] + [0.35 × (4/50)] + [0.65 × (3/50)] +
[0.78 × (5/50)] + [0.44 × (4/50)] + [0.96 × (5/50)] + [0.84 × (4/50)] + [0.47 ×
(4/50)] + [0.24 × (3/50)] + [0.67 × (3/50)] + [0.52 × (5/50)] + [0.72× (5/50)] =
0.6586
Path Prob HTMA = 0.45 × 0.76 × 0.22 × 0.35 × 0.44 × 0.77 × 0.85 × 0.31 ×
0.56 × 0.30 × 0.66 × 0.94 × 0.29 = 0.000071
Path Prob HTMB = 0.99 × 0.35 × 0.65 × 0.78 × 0.44 × 0.96 × 0.84 × 0.47 ×
0.24 × 0.67 × 0.52 ×0.72 = 0.00176

For this example, for all HTM algorithms, the observation matches
sequences learned by HTMB better than sequences learned by HTMA since
HTMB = max HTMA,B(Average()) = max HTMA,B(Weighted Sum()) = max
HTMA,B(Path Probability()) (see eq. 17).
14. Appendix F - The Design of Synthetic Data

Synthetic train and test data was produced for both the HTM and
Markov Chain (MC) based algorithms. The User Attribution solution was
verified against synthetic data that mimics user web visits found in real world
scenarios as shown in Fig. 18, using the algorithm presented in Fig.19. The
User Attribution solution was also verified against MC approaches. These
approaches, as opposed to the HTM, do not leverage any timing information.
For Markov Chains based approaches tests were performed using the same
synthetic data generated by the algorithm in Fig. 19 with the exception that all
timing information (time stamp and TS values) was removed so that only
sequences of destinations are left to be processed. Training and inference for
these alternate approaches took place based on “observations”. Each
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observation simulated a user web session worth of input and consisted of a
predetermined number (50) of web sites visited.
Simulation was performed by using input data that is as representative
of real user network traffic as possible. The input to the HTM prototype has the
following form: Timestamp<TS, Dest>, where: (1) Generation of the
Timestamp input field was accomplished by modeling devices entering
(random distribution arrival times) and leaving (random distribution for service
times) the network. (2) Generation of the TCP TS value was accomplished by
using a 50/50 ratio of TS values started at a fixed value (iphones) and random
values (android phones). (3) Generation of destinations (ranked in order of
popularity) visited by all users in the simulation follow a power law
distribution (Zipf) .

Figure 18 Synthetic Input Data for User Attribution Simulation

Fig. 18 shows the input framework within which the simulation was
run. A Java application was developed separate from the HTM, which
produced, for each user, the synthetic input data as shown in Fig. 18. The data
simulated devices associated with users entering the network at random times
and initiating multiple communication sessions until the devices are turned off.
Table 20 below shows the various random parameters that were used in the
simulation.
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Random
Simulation
Parameters
Power On Time

Statistical
Distributions
Random
Uniform

Boundaries
of Distributions
0 – 3 hours

Intra Session
Time (IRA)

Random
Uniform

0–5
seconds

Inter Session
Time (IRT)

Random
Uniform

1–5
minutes

Service Time

Random
Uniform

Power Off Time

Random
Uniform

Power Off
Time - Power On
Time
0 – 21 hours

Web Destinations

Number of Web
Destinations per user
session
TCP Timestamp
(TS)

Zipf

Random
Uniform
Random
Uniform

1 – 10,000
web destinations
1- 10
destination per
session
0 - 232

Explanations
Simulates users powering on
their devices and entering the
network in the morning hours,
between 6:00 AM and 9:00 AM
Time between HTTP
requests for a given user within the
same user communication session.
User communication sessions
form clusters of web destinations
visited by a user that follow each
other close in time.
Time between the end of a
user communication session and
the beginning of the next user
communication session for that
same user.
Amount of time a device
once powered on remains on in the
network.
Simulates time when users
power off their devices and exit
the network.
Simulates web destinations
ranked in order of importance (1
most visited to 10000 as the least
visited) visited by users.
For each user session a user
is allowed between 1 to 10 web
visits chosen at random.
50 % of devices entering the
network will have a random
starting value while the other 50%
will have a fixed starting value of
0.

Table 20 Simulation Parameters

The input generation application creates an input file for each
simulated user where the numbers of train and test days are configurable
parameters.
The algorithm in Fig. 19 creates 5 simulation days’ worth of synthetic
train data for user Ux. This simulation code generates synthetic data for
training purposes for both HTM and alternate approaches. Each simulation day
contains a random number of user sessions bounded by random intersession
times. Each user session for the HTM is made up of a random number of input
tokens of the form: Timestamp<TS, Dest>. Within a user session, the intra
session time randomly spaces occurrences of the input tokens. Destinations are
selected based on the Zipf distribution, with the most popular destinations
having the highest probability of being selected over less popular destinations.
The algorithm used to implement the zipf distribution is based on the zipf
algorithm used in [20]. Next_ZipfRandom in Fig. 19 returns the next web site
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in rank order from 1 to n (with 1 being the most visited and n the least)
following a power law distribution. The algorithm generates web sites that are
𝟏𝜽

𝟏𝜽

𝟏𝜽

weight proportional to the Riemann zeta function: 𝟏 + 𝟐 +….+ 𝑵 . In the
algorithm in [20], θ(theta) controls the skewness such that θ = 1.0 indicates the
highest skew (all nodes have different popularity) and θ = 0 indicates the
lowest skew (all nodes are equally popular). For this study, theta was set to
0.96.

Ux_Max-Simulation_Days = 5

// Defines max number of Train or Test days

// Create one input file per user Ux in simulation
For Each user Ux in simulation Do
Generate_Input_For_User(Ux, Ux_Max_Simulation_Days)
EnDo
Generate_Input_For_User(Ux, Ux_Max_Simulation_Days)
TimeStamp
=
0
DevicePowerOnTime
=
TimeStamp + Uniform Random(0, 3Hrs)
DevicePowerOffTime
=
DevicePowerOnTime + Uniform Random(0, 21Hrs)
TS
=
Generate TCP TimeStamp-TS
TimeStamp
=
DevicePowerOnTime
While (Ux_Max_Simulation_Days > 0 ) Do
While (TimeStamp < DevicePowerOffTime) Do
NumberDestinationsPerSessions = Uniform Random(1,10)
While (NumberDestinationsPerSessions > 0 AND TimeStamp <
DevicePowerOffTime) Do
Dest
= Next_ZipfRandom (1000,theta) // Get the next destination
Output TimeStamp<TS,Dest> to Ux file name
NumberDestinationsPerSessions = NumberDestinationsPerSessions – 1
IF (NumberDestinationsPerSessions > 0) THEN
IntraSessionTime-IRA =
UniformRandom(0,5secs)
TimeStamp
=
IntraSessionTime-IRA
TS
=
TS + IntraSessionTime
EndIF
EnDO
InterSessionTime-IRT
=
UniformRandom(1,5mins)
TimeStamp
=
InterSessionTime-IRT
TS
=
TS + InterSessionTime
EnDO
Ux_Max_Simulation_Days =
Ux_Max_Simulation_Days – 1
EnDO
Figure 19 High level algorithm to generate synthetic random train input for a single user

Test data had to be created using a different approach since it had to be
similar to the train data but also maintain a certain level of independence from
train data. Three methods were used for generation of synthetic data for the test
phase of experiments. All three algorithms (Random Walk, Walk Only and
Concept Drift) walk a first order Markov chain of learned destinations which

Page 59 of 68

were generated during the training phase of the synthetic data generation
process.
In the “Random Walk” the next destination Vj, for transitions of the
form Vi  Vj, is chosen randomly in proportion to the in-degree of the node Vj.
That is, in proportion to the access frequencies of the neighbors (Vj1,… Vjn) of
the current node (Vi). If no such neighbor Vj exists then the walk proceeds with
a new node Vi with at least one neighbor, selected from the learned destinations
based on a zipf distribution. Selection of the next destination Vj is based on the
work of Price (1976) [39] who proposed a model of networks formation that
gives rise to power-law degree distributions. Price was interested in the power
law distribution of citation networks. Specifically, his model showed that a
newly appearing paper cites previous ones chosen at random with a probability
proportional to the number of citations that those previous papers already have.
This property is critical in creating a relationship between train data generated
for a given user with test data for that same user. While a relationship must
exist between the train and test data sets it must also maintain a certain level of
independence between the two sets which is provided by the randomness of the
selection of already visited nodes. While the Price model has been applied to
simulation of networks traversed by many users, in this study, this model is
adjusted to simulate web visits by a single user. As a result the emphasis was
not placed exclusively on in-degree or out-degree of network nodes but instead
on the frequencies of edges emanating from or terminating to nodes
representing web visits to web sites. The algorithm follows with connectivity
probability
𝑶𝒊
1> r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1)
𝑶𝒊+𝑪𝒊
a learned path proportional to the frequency of the in-degree of web sites along
the path. Otherwise it starts a new path. In terms of notation, r is a random
number that follows a uniform distribution, Ci represents the sum of traversal
frequencies of all edges emanating from Vi (Vi  Vj1-n) and Oi is the out
degree of Vi. As would happen in real life the algorithm favors learned path
patterns, but does also produce variations that simulate "concept drift”. In
“Walk Only” -, the algorithm selects Vj randomly in proportion to access
frequencies of all of Vi's neighbors as long as Vi has at least one neighbor.
Note that this algorithm minimizes any concept drift since it always follows a
learned path as long as one exists, as opposed to the Random Walk algorithm
that is constrained by the connectivity probability and the random value of r. In
“Context Drift”, the algorithm selects Vj using the Walk Only algorithm except
for 20% of the Vj destinations that are selected as new ones outside of the
learned train set. In addition, 10% of the Vi  Vj transitions selected during the
walk are new (not existing in the train set).
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14.1. Evaluating similarity between Synthetic and Real Network data

In order to determine how similar train and test data sets are to each other,
similarity statistics were computed against real cellular network data collected
for an equivalent number of users. Observation similarity statistics between
train and test data sets were generated based on all observations processed
leveraging the work of Kumar and Raju [31].
(OSS)Observation Sequence Similarity
∑|𝑇𝑂|
𝑖=1

(21)

|𝐿𝐶𝑆(𝑇𝑂𝑖, 𝑇𝑟𝑂)|
⁄
|𝑇𝑂𝑖|
|𝑇𝑂|

(OSuS)Observation Substring Similarity
∑|𝑇𝑂|
𝑖=1

=

=

(22)

|𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑢(𝑇𝑂𝑖, 𝑇𝑟𝑂)|
⁄
|𝑇𝑂𝑖|
|𝑇𝑂|

(OSeS)Observation Set Similarity

=
(23)

∑|𝑇𝑂|
𝑖=1

Overall Similarity

|𝑇𝑂𝑖 ∩ 𝑇𝑟𝑂|
|𝑇𝑂𝑖| ⁄
|𝑇𝑂|

=

(24)
(.33)×OSS + (.33)×OSuS + (.33)×OSeS

TO and TrO are the sets of all test and train observations respectively. TOi
is a specific test observation from the test set TO. 𝐿𝐶𝑆(𝑇𝑂𝑖, 𝑇𝑟𝑂) is the length
of the longest common subsequence match between a specific test observation
and all train observations, whereas 𝐿𝐶𝑆𝑢(𝑇𝑂𝑖, 𝑇𝑟𝑂) is the length of the
longest common substring match between a specific test observation and all
train observations. As can be seen from Fig. 20 overall similarity between train
and test synthetic data sets is 50%, with set similarity (observations in train and
test data sets containing the same destinations but not in the same order) being
as high as 83%. Sequence and substring similarity measure how alike
sequences of destinations are between train and test data sets. The real network
data measurements (line in red in Fig. 20) for an equivalent data set (5 users, 5
train days, and 1 test days) collected from a real network show that train and
test data sets are more similar to each other than similar data sets derived from
synthetic data. These results provide support for the belief that synthetic data
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represents a good benchmark for baselining the experiments conducted in this
study.

Figure 20 Similarities between Train and Test Data Sets

15. Appendix G – Why use HTMs when dealing with Complex Networks?

HTMs are unique in stressing the temporal aspect of perception and
implementing memory for sequences of patterns that facilitate anticipation.
Each level in the hierarchy is trained separately to memorize spatial-temporal
objects (patterns) and is able to recognize objects in a bottom-up/top-down
process [18]. The HTM hierarchy also enables efficient representation of
relationships among many inputs by leveraging reuse of lower level inputs in
order to represent higher level concepts at higher levels of the hierarchy. HTMs
allow sequence learning (concatenation of spatial and then temporal learning),
which provides the ability to make predictions and can be applied to
disambiguate input. Only few methods exist that combine spatial and temporal
learning in a tight way (e.g. recurrent neural networks can do this a well) [22].
Of specific interest to this study is the evaluation of the distribution of
visitors to web sites. Adamic and Huberman [1] studied the distribution of
users among web sites by examining usage logs from America Online covering
120,000 sites. They discovered that the distribution of visitors per site follows a
universal power law similar to that found by Pareto in income distributions.
They reasoned that a small number of sites control the traffic of the web
population, a result typical of winner-take-all markets. The authors agree that
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the World Wide Web gives rise to an asymptotic self-similar structure in which
there is no natural scale and the number of users per site is indeed distributed
according to a power law. In another study, Adamic and Huberman [2] find
inconsistencies in the conclusions of a study by Barabasi and Albert [5] which
states that because of preferential treatment, a vertex that acquires more
connections than another will increase its connectivity at a higher rate so that
the connectivity between nodes increases in line with the growth of the
network. This leads to older vertices increasing their connectivity at the
expense of younger and leading to the well known “rich-get-richer”
phenomenon for highly connected vertices. Adamic and Huberman studied
web crawls of 260,000 sites and concluded that all sites are not created equal
since no correlation exists between the age of a site and its number of links.
They explain that the rate of acquisition of new links varies from site to site
and is probably proportional to the number of links the site already has,
because the more links the site already has, the more visible it becomes and the
more links it will get.
While there has been agreement in the research community that
communication traffic has self-similar characteristics, until recently it was
believed that complex networks are not invariant or self-similar under large
scale transformations. This belief is rooted in the small world property of these
networks which would seem to imply that the number of nodes increases
exponentially with the diameter of the network rather than following the power
law relation expected for self-similar structures. Song, Havlin and Maske [44]
analyzed real complex networks, like the web, utilizing a box counting method
as a scale invariant renormalization procedure and concluded that, on the
contrary, these networks consist of self-repeating patterns on all length scales
that suggest they share common self-organizing properties.
What are the implications of addressing the user attribution problem in
the context of complex networks? The self-similar, small world and clustering
properties together with the preferential attachment characteristic of complex
networks supports the notion that users tend to visit a limited number of mostly
popular sites with increasing frequencies. How can the approach implemented
in this study leverage unique and personal patterns to differentiate among users
if different users visit mostly the same sites and this research proposes to use
web site visits as a way to uniquely recognize users?
This study has leveraged the power law properties that characterize web
traffic of users who visit different web sites. Specifically, the implications of
the power law distribution support the notion that while it is true that few web
sites get visited very often by all users, many web sites, in the long tail portion
of the power law distribution, get visited less often by a variety of users as
well. By recording communication patterns of past activity for each user it
becomes possible to identify unique and differentiating elements that will
enable isolation among users. More specifically, the hypothesis in this study
has been that the long tail properties of the distribution of user visits to web
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sites together with the time order of such visits create conditions for unique
differentiation among user patterns that allows to adequately address the user
attribution problem.
HTMs have been successfully used in classification problems in a
variety of applications such as recognition of USPS handwritten digits [8],
speech recognition [17], and prediction of user choices on mobile phones [34].
HTMs have also been used in the area of web analytics which represents an
important use case for this study. In a talk given for the association of
computing machinery (ACM) in 2009, Subutal Ahmad, vice president of
engineering at Numenta, described results of experiments using Numenta’s
HTMs to predict user web click behavior for topics and pages of interest to the
user. In these experiments web content was partitioned into 177 different
topics. In their experiments random prediction reported 0.56% accuracy. By
training the HTM with 100,000 user sequences (web pages) and using no
temporal context (0th order prediction based on recorded popularity of topics
and web pages) the accuracy reported was 23%, which matches what most web
sites can do today. By including in the analysis transition probabilities from a
given web page to another in the form of 1st order prediction, predictive
accuracy increased to 28%. By further leveraging use of variable order
prediction, accuracy levels jumped to 45%. Variable order prediction, used in
this study, allows prediction to fully leverage the dynamic “context” (different
length sequences) of web pages visited by a user.

16. Appendix H – Tables Describing Parameters for Experiments
Table 21 . EXPERIMENT TYPE E1, USER ATTRIBUTION NO CONCEPT DRIFT
Number of Web
Destinations
1000
5000
10,000

Number of Users
5
5/1, 5/2, 3Obs
5/1, 3Obs
5/1, 3Obs

20
5/1, 5/2, 3Obs
5/1, 3Obs
5/1, 3Obs

50

100

5/1, 5/2, 3Obs
5/1, 3Obs
5/1, 3Obs

5/1, 3Obs
5/1,3Obs
5/1,3Obs

500
3Obs
3Obs
3Obs

Table 22 . EXPERIMENT TYPE E2, USER ATTRIBUTION WITH CONCEPT DRIFT
Number
of Users
5
5
5

Number Train Days/Number of Test Days
5/2
Walk Only,
Random Walk
Walk Only 20%

10/3
Walk Only
Random Walk
Walk Only 20%

15/4

20/5

Walk Only
Random Walk
Walk Only 20%

Walk Only
Random Walk
Walk Only 20%
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Number
of Users

Number Train Days/Number of Test Days
5/2
and10%

15/4
and10%

10/3
and10%

20/5
and10%

Table 23. EXPERIMENT TYPE E3, E10 USER ATTRIBUTION UNDER DOS ATTACK
Number of
Users/Numb
er infected
users

DOS Attack Parameters

Number
Destinations/Unit of
Time, Repeats Every
5/5ms, 5ms

10/4

Number
Destinations/Unit of
Time, Repeats Every
10/10ms, 5ms

Number
Destinations/Unit of
Time, Repeats Every
20/20ms, 5ms

Table 24 . EXPERIMENT TYPE E4, E11 USER ATTRIBUTION UNDER PHISH ATTACK
Number of
Users/Number
infected users

10/4

Phish Attack Parameters
Number
Destinations/Unit of
Time, Repeats
Every
1/1ms, (1min-1hour)

Number
Destinations/Unit of
Time, Repeats Every
3/3ms, (1min-1hour)

Number
Destinations/Unit of
Time, Repeats Every
5/5ms, (1min-1hour)

Table 25. EXPERIMENT TYPES E7,E8, E9, USER ATTRIBUTION
Number of Users
5
10

Number Train Days/Number of Test Days
5/1
5/1

5/2
5/2

10/3
10/3

17. Appendix I - Glossary of HTM Abbreviations and Symbols
The table below provides an explanation for many of the abbreviations, terms and
symbols used in HTM computations and algorithms found in the “The Approach”
section.
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Table 26. TERMS USED IN HTM CALCULATIONS AND ALGORITHMS

Terms
ALLLS

ALLLS_Cond
cLLS
DM

𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊

FFB_PP

Fq
gi
IAL

Description
Adjusted Length LLS computes the appropriate proportion of
an input string IS matched against the longest common
subsequence LCS or longest common substring LCSu of a
candidate learned longest common subsequence cLLS that
needs to be accounted for during similarity calculations.
Specifically, ALLLS returns the length of the input sequence IS
matched against subsequence cLLS. This length, based on the
ALLLS_Cond condition, is equal to the size of the input
sequence when IS matches completely from the beginning
sequence cLLS, otherwise the length returned is the size of the
longer sequence between the IS and cLLS. Experiments
conducted during this study have shown that matching
substrings from the beginning of a best matching cLLS
produces better recall accuracy results than matching
substrings sequences in the middle of cLLS.
Adjusted Length LLS condition is true if the size of the input
sequence IS matches completely from the beginning sequence
cLLS.
cLLS refers to a candidate longest learned sequence LLS, one
out possibly many that matches IS, out of all Markov chains in
a given HTM layer.
Degree of Membership finds the best (longest) match
computed based on sequence similarity (SS) between a single
input sequence IS and all cLSS sequences in a given HTM
layer. See equation (8)
Feed forward belief measures the degree of membership (DM)
of a given input sequence at layer Lx-1 of the HTM computed
against the most persistently visited LLS belonging to
Temporal group gi at layer Lx-1. Each computed LLS can only
belong to a unique Markov Chain within an HTM layer. See
equation (9).
Path Probability of LLS is the path probability algorithm
which computes the path probability of matching the longest
learned sequence (LLS) and then for each LLS mismatch
against IS a penalty is computed. The algorithm ensures that
path probability P(LLSk | LLSj) (where LLSk follows directly
LLSj ) is computed only if LLSk and LLSj are both matched in
IS otherwise penalties are computed (as shown in condition
12.c of the path probability algorithm shown in Fig. 17). See
equation (10).
Frequency of visits is used to compute the persistence (PS) of
a given cLLS sequence.
A temporal group gi, also known as “coincidence”, is the
Markov chain which holds the Longest Learned Sequence
(LLS)
Input Activation Level represents the strength of the match of
the input sequence against the longest learned sequence (LLS)
from the HTM layer below Ln-1 and is used to normalize feed
forward belief calculations at layer Ln. Examples of how feed
forward beliefs propagate through HTM layers are shown in
Appendix B. See equation (16)

Page 66 of 68

𝛌𝑳𝒙 <𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊 , 𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊+𝟏, >
λOutput<𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊 , 𝑭𝑭𝑩𝒈𝒊+𝟏, >
LCS

LCSm
LCSu

LCSUm
LLS

MAX_FFB_HTMs

Ps

𝑺𝒈𝒊..𝒊+𝑵 (𝒈𝒊 , 𝒈𝒊+𝟏 ,𝒈𝒊+𝟐,… )
𝑺𝛌𝐎𝐮𝐭𝐩𝐮𝐭𝒌..𝒌+𝑵 (𝛌𝐎𝐮𝐭𝐩𝐮𝐭 𝒌+𝑵 )

A vector of feed forward beliefs at HTM layers 1, 2, 3. The
topmost HTM layer is also known as “output” layer. See
equation (15) for λL2 and equation (14) for λL3.
A vector of feed forward beliefs at the output HTM layer. See
equation (13) for λLoutput
Longest Common Subsequence is computed as the longest
sequence of inputs (web destinations or temporal groups) that
appears left to right but not necessarily in a contiguous block
in both input sequence (IS) and the matched cLLS.
Longest Common Subsequence Measure computes the portion
of the cLLS matched as the longest common subsequence
against the input sequence IS. See equation (1).
Longest Common Substring is computed as the longest
sequence of inputs (web destinations or temporal groups) that
appears left to right in a contiguous block in both input
sequence (IS) and matched cLLS.
Longest Common Substring Measure computes the portion of
the cLLS matched as the longest common substring against the
input sequence IS. See equation (2).
Longest Learned Sequence is the single longest sequence of
learned inputs (web destinations or temporal groups) in a
Markov chain within an HTM layer that best matches the input
sequence. The LLS is discovered by computing the longest
common subsequence and substring of learned sequences in
the HTM (eq. 1,2).
Max Feed Forward Belief for HTMs uses the 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐻𝑇𝑀1..𝑀
function to compute the highest valued feed forward belief
(based on one of 7 HTM algorithms) for a given observation
worth of input for a given HTM/user (see equation 17). To
review examples of calculations of feed forward beliefs
propagating towards upper layers of the HTM during HTM
training see Appendix A and during inference see Appendix B.
Persistence measures how often learned sequences in Markov
chains are visited (see equation 4). For instance, consider the
Markov chains at layer 1 of the HTM in Fig. 14 from
Appendix B, which used the spatial pooler algorithm to
combine groups of web destinations into sequences based on
terminating conditions TC1-3. These Markov chains were
created during the training phase using sequences of web sites
as shown in Table 10 from Appendix A. All nodes in Fig. 14
represent unique web destinations, with the exception of
cloned nodes which are represented using prime symbols as in
S3’ and S3’’. Assume that cLLS = <S1, S2, S3 ,S4> then
Fq(cLLS) = 1, NLS = 16 and Ps(cLLS) = 1/16. As another
example, assume cLLS = <S1,S3,S6> from Fig. 14, then
Fq(cLLS) = 2, NLS = 16 and Ps(cLLS) = 2/16.
Sequence of temporal groups received from a lower HTM
layer which represents an input sequence learned and inferred
within variable order Markov chains at HTM layers 2 and 3
A sequence of feed forward beliefs received at Max Output
layer from a given HTM i for a single observation worth of data
and represents an input sequence (IS) received at the Max
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Sp
SS

Timestamp<TS, Dest>

Ws

Output layer.
Sequence persistence measures the persistence (frequency) of
visits (Ps) to a given cLLS normalized using persistence
weight WP. See equation (7).
Sequence Similarity measures the similarity of an input
sequence (IS) and cLLS based on the aggregate of longest
common subsequence (LCSm) and substring measures
(LCSUm ) normalized with subsequence and substring weights
(Ws,Wu). See equation (6).
Represents HTM input at layer 1. Timestamp is the time in
milliseconds when the input was received by the HTM. TCP
Timestamp (TS) is the time in milliseconds when a TCP packet
was sent. Destination (Dest) is the destination address
(represented within the HTM as a number) of the HTTP
request received by the HTM.
Similarity weights represent the relative importance attributed
to different components of the sequence similarity calculation.
Ws represents the weight given to the longest common
subsequence portion of the sequence similarity calculation. Wu
represents the weight given to the longest common substring
portion of the sequence similarity calculation. Wp represents
the weight given to the sequence persistence calculation. The
similarity weights values are based on results from
experiments which have shown that sequence persistence (SP)
which is simply based on frequency of occurrences of learned
sequences, while necessary to improve overall accuracy
results, has the least impact on overall recall accuracy in
contrast to the sequence similarity calculation (SS) which
instead is based on recognition of the timed order of web
destinations within learned sequences.
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